Francisco v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 102330 · 1998-11-25 · J. QUISUMBING, J.: · Primary: Civil; Secondary: Remedial
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: Petitioner Teresita C. Francisco is the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio Francisco by his second marriage. Private respondents Conchita Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla, and Antonio Francisco are Eusebio's children from his first marriage. Petitioner alleged that she and Eusebio acquired a sari-sari store, a residential house and lot, and an apartment house in Rodriguez, Rizal, and a house and lot in Barrio San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal. She claimed these properties were administered by Eusebio until he became incapacitated due to illness. Petitioner further alleged that the private respondents convinced Eusebio to sign a general power of attorney authorizing Conchita Evangelista to administer some of these properties. Procedural History: Petitioner filed a suit for damages, annulment of the general power of attorney, and to be declared the administratrix of the properties. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of the private respondents, dismissing the complaint and declaring Eusebio Francisco the administrator of the properties, ordering the plaintiff to pay attorney's fees. The RTC held that petitioner failed to prove the properties were acquired during the second marriage or belonged exclusively to her, thus ruling they were Eusebio's exclusive capital properties. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision in toto. The Petition: Petitioner sought reversal of the Court of Appeals' decision, raising errors concerning the application of Articles 160 and 158 of the Civil Code and Article 124 of the Family Code, and arguing for the application of Article 116 of the Family Code.

Issue(s)

Whether the respondent appellate court erred in applying Articles 160 and 158 of the Civil Code, which were allegedly repealed by the Family Code, and whether Article 124 of the Family Code applies. Whether the properties in controversy are conjugal or the exclusive capital properties of Eusebio Francisco. Whether Article 116 of the Family Code applies to the case. Whether petitioner Teresita C. Francisco can be declared the administratrix of the properties.

Ruling

The petition is denied, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The properties in controversy are declared to be the exclusive capital properties of Eusebio Francisco.

Ratio Decidendi

On the applicability of Articles 158 and 160 of the Civil Code and the Family Code, and Article 124 of the Family Code: The Court held that while Articles 158 and 160 of the New Civil Code were indeed repealed by Article 254 of the Family Code, their repeal does not operate to prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights pursuant to Article 256 of the Family Code. Therefore, the rights accrued and vested while the cited articles were in effect survive their repeal, and the issue of the nature of the contested properties must be resolved based on the provisions of the New Civil Code. The Court clarified that petitioner's allegation of repeal by Article 253 was incorrect, as it was Article 254 that expressly repealed the relevant provisions. On whether the properties are conjugal or exclusive capital properties of Eusebio Francisco: The Court reiterated that under Article 160 of the New Civil Code, the presumption of conjugality requires proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. Petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence to show that the properties were acquired during her marriage with Eusebio. Regarding the land at Col. Cruz St., petitioner failed to refute Eusebio's testimony that he inherited it, and she admitted he brought it into the marriage. Even if acquired during the second marriage, inheritance is a lucrative title, making it exclusive property under Article 148 of the Civil Code. For the house, apartment, and sari-sari store, the building permits and business license naming petitioner as applicant or licensee did not prove acquisition during the second marriage, especially when other exhibits described Eusebio as the owner. The Court also noted that the sari-sari store, even if constructed on Eusebio's land, could not be deemed conjugal without proof of construction at the partnership's expense, and the lack of proof of erection during the second marriage prevented the application of the Article 160 presumption. As for the San Isidro property, the registration in the name of "Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco" was merely descriptive of Eusebio's civil status and did not prove acquisition during coverture, as registration merely confirms existing title. On whether Article 116 of the Family Code applies to the case: There was no explicit discussion or ruling regarding Article 116 of the Family Code in the provided text. Therefore, this issue cannot be addressed based on the given information. On the administration of the properties: The Court ruled that Eusebio shall retain control of the properties as they are his exclusive capital. Even assuming they were conjugal, petitioner could not administer them because Eusebio was not incapacitated. The lower court found that Eusebio was not suffering from serious illness impairing his fitness to administer his properties. His leg injury, even if aggravated by an incident involving petitioner, did not render him incapacitated.

Main Doctrine

The presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code that all property of the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership requires proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. Without such proof, the presumption does not operate. Furthermore, rights accrued and vested under the Civil Code survive its repeal by the Family Code, pursuant to Article 256 of the Family Code, which provides for retroactive effect only insofar as it does not prejudice vested or acquired rights.

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