Tan v. People
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On October 26, 1989, a dump truck driven by Fred Moreno, an employee of A & E Construction owned by Alejandro Tan, was intercepted carrying narra and white lauan lumber. On October 30, 1989, another dump truck driven by Crispin Cabudol, also an employee of A & E Construction, was apprehended with tanguile lumber. In both instances, no documents proving legal possession of the lumber were presented, leading to confiscation. Procedural History: Alejandro Tan, Ismael Ramilo, and Fred Moreno were charged with violation of Section 68, PD 705, as amended by EO 277, for illegal possession of lumber. Crispin Cabudol was also charged in a separate information. The Regional Trial Court of Romblon convicted all accused, sentencing them to an indeterminate sentence and ordering the confiscation of the lumber. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision. The Petition: Petitioners seek to set aside the Court of Appeals' decision, raising several issues including the applicability of Section 68 of EO 277, the classification of lumber as timber or forest product, and the alleged retroactive application of EO 277.
Issue(s)
Whether lumber is considered timber or a forest product within the contemplation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. Whether the possession of the lumber was illegal and punishable under the Forestry Reform Code. Whether Executive Order No. 277 was applied retroactively. Whether Section 68 of EO 277 is constitutional. Whether the petitioners were guilty of conspiracy.
Ruling
The petition is denied for utter lack of merit. The questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the classification of lumber as timber or forest product: The Court reiterated its ruling in Mustang Lumber, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals that lumber is included in the term timber. Lumber is defined as timber or logs after being prepared for the market, thus a processed log or timber. The Court emphasized that Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber, following the principle of ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus (where the law does not distinguish, we ought not to distinguish). The phrase 'forest product' is broad enough to encompass lumber, and to exclude its possession from the acts penalized would emasculate the law. The Court also noted that American jurisprudence accepts lumber as a term referring to the manufactured product of logs or timber sawed or split into marketable form. On the illegality of possession and the required documents: The Court affirmed the findings of the lower courts that the petitioners failed to present the necessary legal documents to prove lawful possession of the lumber. The Forestry Reform Code, as amended, requires not only an auxiliary invoice but also a certificate of origin, sales invoice, scale/tally sheets, and a lumber dealer permit. The defense's claim of lawful purchase from Cajidiocan Trading, supported only by an auxiliary invoice from Matzhou Development Corporation dated March 19, 1987, was deemed insufficient and highly doubtful given the apprehension in October 1989. The Court found that the lumber was being transported without the requisite legal documents. On the alleged retroactive application of EO 277: The Court dismissed the argument that EO 277 was applied retroactively. It noted that EO 277, which specifically included "possession" of timber and other forest products within the contemplation of PD 705, was already in effect for over two years prior to the apprehension in October 1989. The prohibited act is a malum prohibitum, meaning absence of malice or criminal intent does not absolve the offender. Furthermore, the Court found it highly doubtful that the lumber allegedly bought in March 1987 was the same lumber confiscated in October 1989, and even if it were, the required supporting documents were still absent. On the constitutionality of Section 68 of EO 277: The Court held that the petitioners failed to establish an actual case or controversy regarding the constitutionality of the provision. They were not charged with the possession of items like firewood or grass, which they argued were improperly included in the definition of forest products. Therefore, the inclusion of these items was of no concern to them. The Court reiterated that a statute is presumed constitutional, and the burden of proving its invalidity rests on the party challenging it, which the petitioners failed to do. On conspiracy: The Court found sufficient evidence of conspiracy, particularly through the admission of co-accused Ismael Ramilo. Ramilo testified that the deliveries of lumber were made pursuant to Tan's instructions and that Tan owned the lumber, trucks, and the construction firm. The drivers caught in flagrante delicto were merely employees of Tan, supporting the conclusion that they acted in concert.
Main Doctrine
Possession of lumber, being a processed timber or forest product, without the required legal documents is punishable under Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by EO 277.