Republic v. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 119292 · 1998-07-31 · J. PANGANIBAN, J.: · Primary: Remedial; Secondary: Political, Civil
REITERATION

Facts

1. The Antecedents: The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) issued sequestration orders on May 9, 1986, against Prime Holdings, Inc. (PHI) and 111,415 shares of Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC) registered in PHI's name. These orders were issued as part of the government's effort to recover alleged ill-gotten wealth accumulated during the Marcos administration. The PCGG alleged that these assets were disproportionate to the lawful income of the individuals involved and were acquired through undue advantage of public office. 2. Procedural History: The PCGG filed a complaint for reconveyance and damages (Civil Case No. 0002) on July 16, 1987, against various individuals. An amended complaint filed on April 23, 1990, included Imelda Cojuangco, the estate of Ramon Cojuangco, and Prime Holdings, Inc. as additional defendants. On May 4, 1993, the private respondents filed a motion to declare the sequestration orders automatically lifted, citing procedural defects and the failure to file the appropriate judicial action within the constitutional period. The Sandiganbayan granted this motion in a Resolution dated December 17, 1993, and denied the PCGG's motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated August 29, 1994. The PCGG then filed the instant petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. 3. The Petition: The PCGG seeks to annul the Sandiganbayan's Resolutions, arguing that the sequestration orders were valid despite being signed by only one commissioner and that the proper judicial action was timely filed. The PCGG contends that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion by declaring the sequestration orders invalid due to the single signature and by ruling that the government failed to implead the private respondents within the period prescribed by Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The petition raises the principal issues of the validity of the sequestration orders and the timeliness of the judicial action against the private respondents.

Issue(s)

Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the writs of sequestration invalid for not being authorized by at least two PCGG commissioners pursuant to Sec. 3 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations. Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the writs of sequestration to have been automatically lifted for alleged failure of the PCGG to file the proper judicial action against private respondents within the period fixed in Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. Whether the Sandiganbayan misapplied prior rulings (including PCGG v. International Copra Export Corp. and Republic v. Sandiganbayan) regarding whether filing against a stockholder constitutes the "judicial action" contemplated by the Constitution. Whether Filmerco v. IAC was misinterpreted or misapplied by the Sandiganbayan in relation to the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.

Ruling

The petition is DENIED. The assailed Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED. The writs of sequestration directed against Prime Holdings, Inc. and the 111,415 PTIC shares registered in its name are declared automatically lifted for (1) invalidity due to non-observance of Sec. 3 of the PCGG Rules requiring the authority of at least two commissioners, and (2) in any event, failure of the PCGG to commence the proper judicial action or to implead the private respondents within the period prescribed by Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Ratio Decidendi

On Issue 1: The Court held that Sec. 3 of the PCGG Rules clearly requires the authority of at least two commissioners to issue a writ of sequestration and that authority should be evident on the face of the writ itself, ordinarily by the signatures of two commissioners. The PCGG\'s post facto claim that "authority" could be verbal or reflected in minutes of meetings was viewed as self-serving and made after the fact; contemporaneous construction by an agency is respected but will be set aside when clearly erroneous or when the language is plain. The Court reasoned that a sequestration writ bearing only one signature is an obvious transgression of the PCGG Rule, and because sequestration is an extraordinary remedy that intrudes on proprietary rights it must be strictly construed against the State. Applying the Court\'s prior articulation in Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. (BASECO) and other authorities that sequestration is an extraordinary and harsh remedy, the two-commissioner rule was intended to assure a collegial determination of a prima facie case. The decision also distinguished precedents where single-signed writs were upheld when issued before the PCGG Rules took effect, finding those authorities inapplicable here because the subject writs were issued after April 11, 1986. On Issue 2: The Court found that the constitutional time-frame in Section 26, Article XVIII (the six-month rule) must be respected and that the PCGG failed to institute the corresponding judicial action against PHI or to implead it within the prescribed period. The Court explained that an original complaint that does not include or refer to the specific corporation as a defendant, and an amendment impleading the corporation filed years later, do not relate back so as to satisfy the constitutional requirement. The Court reiterated that mere listing of related corporations in an annex to a complaint against individual defendants is insufficient to satisfy the constitutional mandate when the sequestered corporation itself was not included as a defendant within the prescribed period. The opinion relied on prior decisions emphasizing due process and the distinct corporate personality of corporations such as PHI, PTIC and PLDT, and refused to disregard separation of corporate identity without a hearing. Consequently, even if substantive proof of ill-gotten wealth were later adduced in the main action, the constitutional time limit for maintaining a sequestration was not met and the sequestration must be lifted. On Issue 3 (application of prior rulings): The Court explained that the line of cases cited by petitioner does not assist because the requisites identified in those rulings (a timely filed complaint sufficiently referring to the sequestered assets or entities) were not satisfied here. The Court applied the rationale of Republic v. Sandiganbayan (First Division) insofar as it permits existing sequestrations to remain when the complaint filed within the constitutional period specifically refers to the corporations or assets; but it clarified that the present case falls outside that rule because the original complaint did not implead PHI or include it in the annex listing. The Court also examined PCGG v. International Copra Export Corp. and related precedents and held that the requirements established there had not been met in this case. The remedy available to the government to recover alleged ill-gotten wealth remains in the main action, but the provisional administrative custody by PCGG over these particular assets could not be sustained in view of the procedural defects. On Issue 4 (Filmerco and piercing the corporate veil): The Court declined to accept petitioner\'s contention that Filmerco v. IAC should be read to displace the normal rule on corporate personality; it observed that Filmerco\'s statement was not a ground to ignore due process protections nor to allow indefinite sequestration absent compliance with the constitutional period or the PCGG\'s own rules. The Court emphasized that allegations that PHI acted as nominee or repository of ill-gotten wealth must be established in the main case where evidence can be presented and where due process allows the affected corporate entity its day in court. Thus, the Court did not accept an argument that Filmerco constituted authority to bypass the constitutional and procedural safeguards as asserted by petitioner.

Main Doctrine

Sequestration orders signed by only one PCGG commissioner in violation of Sec. 3 of the PCGG Rules are invalid; moreover, failure to commence the corresponding judicial action or to implead the sequestered entity within the period prescribed in Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution will result in the sequestration being automatically lifted.

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