Pepsi Cola Products Phil., Inc. v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The case arose from the "Pepsi Number Fever Promotion" where numerous holders of the "349" crowns were not paid by petitioner Pepsi Cola Products Philippines, Inc. (PCPPI) due to alleged mistake in security codes. Private respondents, holders of "349" Pepsi Crowns, filed a civil case for collection of sum of money and damages against PCPPI. 2. Procedural History: The case experienced numerous cancellations and postponements. While private respondents finished presenting evidence, petitioner repeatedly sought postponements due to unavailability of witnesses. The presentation of petitioner's evidence was initially scheduled for various dates in 1993. Despite warnings, petitioner orally moved for postponement on October 14, 1993, which was granted with a warning of waiver. Further hearings were cancelled due to the absence of the presiding judge and later, due to the retirement of the judge and substitution of counsel. On November 18, 1994, petitioner again moved for postponement due to witness unavailability, with hearings reset for January 20, 1995, and February 9, 1995, with a directive to finish presentation of evidence and a warning that the settings were "intransferrable in character." On January 20, 1995, petitioner again moved for cancellation due to witnesses' other commitments. The trial court denied the motion and issued an order declaring petitioner to have waived its right to present further evidence, deeming the case submitted for decision. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, explaining witness unavailability due to simultaneous hearings in other cases. The trial court denied the motion, citing the intransferable nature of the hearing, lack of prior written motion, absence of showing priority for other cases, and the fact that the case had been pending for a long time with ample opportunity given to petitioner. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals denied due course to, holding that petitioner's counsel had ample time to prepare and manage witness schedules, and that the reasons for postponement were not legal justifications for preferring other cases to the detriment of the case at bar. The appellate court found the trial court's order in line with the rule that motions for continuance are addressed to the sound discretion of the court. 3. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, contending that the Court of Appeals' decision contravened due process, was not in accord with law and jurisprudence, and that the trial court's departure from usual proceedings warranted the Supreme Court's supervisory powers. Petitioner also argued that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioner's oral motion for postponement and subsequent motion for reconsideration, thereby declaring petitioner to have waived its right to present evidence. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's orders.
Ruling
The petition is devoid of merit. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for review on certiorari and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision was to deny due course to the petition for certiorari and dismiss it.
Ratio Decidendi
On the denial of the motion for postponement and declaration of waiver: The Supreme Court reiterated that a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right but is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Its action will not be disturbed by appellate courts absent a clear and manifest abuse of discretion resulting in a denial of substantial justice. Section 4 of Rule 22 of the Revised Rules of Court (now Section 3 of Rule 30 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) requires an affidavit showing the materiality of the evidence expected and due diligence used to procure it. The Court found that petitioner failed to allege and prove the materiality of its witnesses' testimonies and did not present a meritorious claim or defense, relying instead on citing cases with different factual circumstances. The grounds for postponement cited by petitioner, such as witnesses being preoccupied with other commitments or testifying in other cases, were not considered valid justifications, especially when the hearings were declared "intransferrable" and petitioner had ample opportunity to arrange schedules. The Court noted that petitioner's counsel exhibited a propensity for dilatory schemes, which is viewed with disfavor. The trial court correctly denied the motion for reconsideration. The reasons cited by the trial court, including the intransferable character of the hearing set by agreement, the lack of a prior written motion for cancellation, the absence of a showing that other cases warranted priority, and the considerable length of time the case had been pending, were found to be valid. The Court emphasized that fairness dictated filing a written motion long before the scheduled date, not a verbal motion on the day of the hearing. Furthermore, the motion for reconsideration did not state the nature of the intended witnesses' testimony, leaving the court without a basis to determine if it was merely corroborative or cumulative. The Court also highlighted that petitioner had been given ample opportunity to present its evidence but opted not to exercise its rights. On the Court of Appeals' affirmation: The Supreme Court found no error in the Court of Appeals' affirmation of the trial court's orders. The appellate court correctly observed that petitioner's counsel had sufficient time to prepare for the scheduled hearing and manage witness schedules. The Court of Appeals also rightly pointed out that the numerous other cases involving similar issues and the same set of witnesses did not constitute legal justifications for giving preference to those cases to the detriment of the case at bar. The appellate court's conclusion that the trial court acted within its sound discretion was consistent with established jurisprudence.
Main Doctrine
A motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right but is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and its action thereon will not be disturbed by appellate courts in the absence of clear and manifest abuse of discretion resulting in a denial of substantial justice. Failure to comply with procedural requirements for such motions, such as providing an affidavit showing materiality of evidence and due diligence, and the repeated seeking of postponements without valid justification, can lead to a waiver of the right to present evidence.