Sunga v. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 125629 · 1998-03-25 · J. BELLOSILLO, J.: · Primary: Political; Secondary: Remedial
NEW DOCTRINE

Facts

The Antecedents: Petitioner Manuel C. Sunga, a candidate for Mayor of Iguig, Cagayan, filed a letter-complaint against respondent Ferdinand B. Trinidad, the incumbent mayor and candidate for re-election, for allegedly using three local government vehicles in his campaign, violating Sec. 261, par. (o) of BP Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code). Sunga later filed another complaint for violation of Sec. 261, par. (e) (threats, intimidation, coercion) and an Amended Petition consolidating these charges, including vote buying. The case was docketed as SPA No. 95-213. Procedural History: The COMELEC 2nd Division referred the complaint to its Law Department for investigation. Hearings were held, and Sunga presented evidence, while Trinidad opted not to submit any. Trinidad garnered the highest number of votes and was proclaimed Mayor, despite Sunga's motions to suspend the proclamation. The COMELEC Law Department recommended charging Trinidad in court for election offenses and recalling his proclamation. The COMELEC En Banc approved these findings and directed the filing of criminal informations. The disqualification case was referred back to the COMELEC 2nd Division. The Petition: The COMELEC 2nd Division dismissed the disqualification case, citing Resolution No. 2050, which mandates dismissal if a disqualification case is unresolved after the election. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed this dismissal. Sunga filed a petition for certiorari, arguing grave abuse of discretion, contending that RA No. 6646 requires resolution of the case even after proclamation, that COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 contravenes the law, and that the filing of criminal informations indicated sufficient evidence for disqualification. He also argued that he should be proclaimed Mayor if Trinidad were disqualified.

Issue(s)

Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the disqualification case against respondent Ferdinand B. Trinidad. Whether COMELEC Resolution No. 2050, as interpreted in Silvestre v. Duavit, is valid and applicable to a disqualification case filed before the election but unresolved thereafter; and whether the petition suffered from timeliness and procedural defects. Whether the proclamation and assumption of office by a winning candidate divest the COMELEC of its jurisdiction to resolve a pending disqualification case. Whether the petitioner, Manuel C. Sunga, is entitled to be proclaimed Mayor if respondent Ferdinand B. Trinidad is disqualified.

Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious. The Supreme Court annulled and set aside the Resolutions of the COMELEC dated May 17, 1996, and July 30, 1996, and ordered the COMELEC to reinstate SPA No. 95-213 and act on the case in accordance with the Court's opinion. The Court ruled that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the disqualification case.

Ratio Decidendi

On the COMELEC's dismissal of the disqualification case: The Court found that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. It clarified that COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 does not mandate the dismissal of a disqualification case filed before an election but remaining unresolved after the election; instead, it requires referral to the Law Department for investigation. The Court held that the interpretation in Silvestre v. Duavit, which mandated outright dismissal in such a scenario, contravened Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646. This law explicitly requires the COMELEC to continue the trial and hearing of a disqualification case even after the election and proclamation, especially when the evidence of guilt is strong, and may even order the suspension of proclamation. The Court emphasized that the legislative intent is for the COMELEC to proceed to judgment, and any interpretative ruling by the COMELEC that limits the scope of the law or amends an act of Congress is invalid. On the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 and the timeliness and procedural defects of the petition: The Court rejected the argument that the disqualification case was filed late. It held that the amended petition, filed after the election, retroacted to the dates of the original letter-complaints filed before the election. The Court also found the procedural defects, such as non-payment of docket fees and lack of immediate summons, to be non-fatal. It noted that the COMELEC acted on the petition, implying discretion was exercised, and that these defects were subsequently cured by payment of fees and service of summons. Therefore, the private respondent had no cause to complain about these procedural lapses. On the COMELEC's jurisdiction despite proclamation and assumption of office: The Court affirmed that the proclamation and assumption of office by a winning candidate do not divest the COMELEC of its authority to continue hearing and decide a disqualification case. Citing Aguam v. COMELEC, the Court reiterated that the COMELEC has the authority to annul illegal canvasses and proclamations, and this power is not barred by the candidate's assumption of office. The purpose of disqualification proceedings is to prevent a candidate from serving, and the fact of proclamation does not condone the offense or preclude further investigation. On the petitioner's entitlement to the office: The Court ruled that even if Trinidad were disqualified, Sunga would not automatically be proclaimed Mayor. Citing Geronimo v. Ramos and Aquino v. COMELEC, the Court explained that the votes cast for a disqualified candidate are not counted for the purpose of installing the winner, but the votes for the second placer are not automatically transferred. The Court emphasized that election is the expression of the popular will, and imposing a candidate who was not chosen by the electorate would be repugnant to suffrage. In case of a permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor due to disqualification, the duly elected Vice-Mayor would succeed, as provided by Section 44 of RA No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).

Main Doctrine

A disqualification case filed before an election but unresolved after the election must be investigated by the COMELEC's Law Department, and its dismissal as a disqualification case is not mandated by COMELEC Resolution No. 2050, as this would contravene Section 6 of RA No. 6646, which requires the continuation of the trial and hearing of such cases. The proclamation and assumption of office by a winning candidate do not divest the COMELEC of its jurisdiction to resolve a pending disqualification case.

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