Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 126000, G.R. No. 128520 · 1998-10-07 · J. MARTINEZ, J.: · Primary: Civil; Secondary: Civil Procedure, Property
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the sale of approximately 128 hectares of land owned by the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS). Initially leased to Capitol Hills Golf & Country Club Inc. (CHGCCI) in 1965, MWSS was directed by a Letter of Instruction in 1976 to negotiate the cancellation of the lease and disposition of the property. MWSS subsequently informed CHGCCI of its preferential right to purchase the land. An appraisal company set the fair market value at P40.00 per square meter. Following presidential approval, MWSS, through Resolution 36-83, approved the sale of the property to SILHOUETTE TRADING CORPORATION, as assignee of CHGCCI, at the appraised value. A sales agreement was executed, with a down payment and the balance secured by a letter of credit. SILHOUETTE later sold approximately 67 hectares of this property to AYALA CORPORATION, which developed it into the Ayala Heights Subdivision. Procedural History: In 1993, MWSS filed an action seeking the nullity of the sales agreement with SILHOUETTE and subsequent conveyances, and recovery of the property with damages. Respondent AYALA filed an answer asserting affirmative defenses, including prescription, laches, and estoppel. The trial court dismissed MWSS's complaint on these grounds. MWSS appealed to the Court of Appeals, assigning several errors, including the trial court's treatment of affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissal and its premature resolution of factual issues. Meanwhile, other respondents also filed motions to dismiss, which the trial court initially denied. These denials led to special civil actions for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in a consolidated decision, denied the petitions for certiorari and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint against AYALA. MWSS appealed this decision to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 126000). Separately, the trial court later granted another motion to dismiss filed by other respondents, prompting MWSS to file another petition for review (G.R. No. 128520). These two petitions were consolidated. The Petition: The consolidated petitions before the Supreme Court challenge the rulings of the lower courts that the action has prescribed, is barred by laches, or suffers from non-joinder of indispensable parties. MWSS argues that its complaint seeks the declaration of nullity of void ab initio contracts, which is imprescriptible. It contends that the contracts were voidable at most, and the prescriptive period of four years under Article 1391 of the New Civil Code had already expired before the complaint was filed. MWSS also argues that the alleged vitiation of consent, whether by undue influence or fraud, renders the contracts voidable, not void. Furthermore, MWSS asserts that the doctrine of laches, which requires inequity founded on a change in the condition of the property or the relation of the parties due to delay, is not applicable. The petitions also address the issue of ratification, arguing that the MWSS Board's resolution and subsequent actions constituted ratification of the sale. Finally, the petitions address the non-joinder of indispensable parties, asserting that the numerous lot owners in the developed subdivision are indispensable parties whose absence renders the action dismissible.

Issue(s)

Whether the action for declaration of nullity of the sales agreement has prescribed. Whether the action is barred by laches. Whether the sale was ratified by MWSS. Whether the non-joinder of indispensable parties warrants the dismissal of the complaint.

Ruling

The consolidated petitions are DENIED. The Court affirmed the dismissal of MWSS's complaint.

Ratio Decidendi

On the issue of prescription: The Court held that the allegations in MWSS's complaint, even if hypothetically true, describe voidable contracts, not void ab initio contracts, because the elements of consent, object, and cause were present. The alleged vitiation of consent through undue influence or fraud renders a contract voidable under Article 1330 of the Civil Code, not void. Consequently, the four-year prescriptive period under Article 1391 of the Civil Code applies. If consent was vitiated by undue influence, the period began upon the cessation of the defect (February 26, 1986, when President Marcos was deposed), meaning prescription would have set in by February 26, 1990. If vitiated by fraud, the period commenced upon discovery, which is deemed to have occurred in 1983 (date of sale documents) or at the latest in 1984 (date of registration), meaning the action would have prescribed by 1988. The Court also clarified that the prayers in a complaint do not determine the nature of the action; it is the material allegations of fact that are controlling. Therefore, the action for annulment of a voidable contract had prescribed. On the issue of laches: Even if the contracts were considered void ab initio and thus imprescriptible, the Court found that the action was barred by laches. Laches is concerned with the inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced after a delay, regardless of statutory periods. The elements of laches were present: (1) conduct giving rise to the situation (the sale and subsequent transfers); (2) delay in asserting rights (almost ten years from 1983 to 1993); (3) lack of notice to the defendant that the complainant would assert the right (MWSS accepted downpayments and a letter of credit, leading respondents to believe the conveyances were honored); and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant if relief is granted (respondents developed the property and would be prejudiced by the nullification). The Court emphasized that setting aside transactions to accommodate a party who has slept on their rights is anathema to good order. On the issue of ratification: The Court found that any perceived infirmity in the initial agreement, even if entered into without express written authority for the agent, was cured by ratification. The MWSS Board of Trustees expressly ratified the sale by passing Resolution No. 36-83, approving the sale and authorizing the General Manager to sign the contract papers. Furthermore, there was implied ratification through silence and acquiescence, evidenced by MWSS sending demand letters for payment, accepting a P25 million downpayment, and accepting a letter of credit for the balance. The failure to return these amounts further indicated acceptance and retention of benefits flowing from the transaction. On the issue of non-joinder of indispensable parties: The Court held that the lot owners to whom the land had been parceled out were indispensable parties. Their proprietary rights would be directly affected by an action for recovery of the property. The absence of indispensable parties renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act. Therefore, the action should be dismissed for failure to implead these indispensable parties.

Main Doctrine

A contract that is voidable due to vitiated consent, even if alleged to be void ab initio, is subject to the prescriptive period for annulment. Furthermore, even if not barred by prescription, an action to declare such a contract void may be barred by laches. The presence of indispensable parties is also a ground for dismissal.

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