Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation
NEW DOCTRINEFacts
The Antecedents: The Municipality of Parañaque, through Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, filed a Complaint for expropriation against V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land for a socialized housing project. Prior to this, the Municipality had attempted a negotiated sale pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991, which was not accepted by the respondent. Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially gave due course to the complaint and issued an order authorizing the Municipality to take possession of the property upon deposit. However, upon motion of V.M. Realty Corporation, the RTC treated its Answer as a motion to dismiss and subsequently issued a Resolution dismissing the case. The RTC found that no ordinance authorized the expropriation, thus stating no cause of action, and that the action was barred by res judicata due to a prior dismissed expropriation case involving the same property. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision in toto. The CA denied the Municipality's motion for reconsideration. The Petition: The Municipality of Parañaque filed a petition for review on certiorari, arguing that a resolution substantially complies with the requirement for expropriation and that res judicata should not apply when public interest is involved.
Issue(s)
Whether a resolution of the municipal council substantially complies with the statutory requirement of Section 19 of RA 7160 for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Whether the complaint states a cause of action. Whether the principle of res judicata is applicable to the present case.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that the Municipality of Parañaque failed to comply with the legal requirement of an ordinance for the exercise of eminent domain. The Court also clarified that while res judicata may apply to specific issues, it does not perpetually bar the State or its agent from exercising the inherent power of eminent domain once all legal requirements are met.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether a resolution substantially complies with the requirement of an ordinance for expropriation: The Court held that a resolution does not substantially comply with the requirement of an ordinance as mandated by Section 19 of RA 7160. An ordinance is a law with a general and permanent character, while a resolution merely expresses the sentiment or opinion of the lawmaking body. The Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) explicitly requires an ordinance, a clear divergence from the previous law (BP 337) which allowed a resolution. The Court emphasized that legislative intent must be determined from the clear language of the statute, and in this case, the requirement for an ordinance is unambiguous. The power of eminent domain, being a derogation of private rights, must be exercised strictly in accordance with the law. Therefore, the expropriation suit filed pursuant to a mere resolution lacked the necessary legal authorization, rendering the complaint without a valid cause of action. On the issue of whether the complaint states a cause of action: The Court ruled that the complaint failed to state a cause of action because the Municipality of Parañaque sought to exercise the power of eminent domain based on a resolution, not an ordinance, as required by Section 19 of RA 7160. The sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint itself is the basis for determining a cause of action when a motion to dismiss is filed on this ground. Since the complaint, on its face, showed non-compliance with the legal prerequisite of an ordinance, it did not contain allegations that would allow for a valid judgment in favor of the Municipality. The subsequent passage of an ordinance after the filing of the complaint could not cure this inherent defect. On the issue of whether the principle of res judicata is applicable: The Court acknowledged that all the requisites for res judicata were present, as there was a prior final judgment on the merits involving identical interests, subject matter, and cause of action. However, the Court clarified that while res judicata may bar the relitigation of specific issues decided in a prior case, it cannot perpetually bar the State or its authorized agent from exercising the inherent power of eminent domain. The right to exercise eminent domain is considered absolute and unfettered, as it is a necessary attribute of sovereignty. Therefore, the previous dismissal of an expropriation case due to non-compliance with a legal requirement does not prevent the State or its agent from reinstituting proceedings once all legal requirements, including those previously unmet, are properly complied with. This ensures that the power of eminent domain is not unduly diminished and serves the interests of social justice.
Main Doctrine
A local government unit cannot authorize the expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body; an ordinance is expressly required by Section 19 of RA 7160. The principle of res judicata does not bar subsequent expropriation proceedings when all legal requirements are complied with.