Cuison v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On February 7, 1989, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan rendered a Joint Decision finding Eduardo Cuison guilty of double homicide and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment and to pay civil indemnity to the heirs of the victims. Procedural History: The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision with modification, increasing the civil indemnity to P50,000.00 but leaving the penalty of imprisonment untouched. The Supreme Court denied Cuison's petition for review. Upon remand, the RTC promulgated the decision only with respect to the modified civil liability, failing to commit Cuison to jail. The CA, in a Resolution, clarified that its earlier decision affirmed the penalty of imprisonment. The RTC then set the promulgation anew, but Cuison filed a motion to set aside promulgation, arguing that the judgment was already promulgated and that a second promulgation would violate his right against double jeopardy. The RTC granted Cuison's motion. The Petition: The People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Court of Appeals, contending that the RTC judge gravely abused his discretion in refusing to execute the penalty of imprisonment. The CA set aside the RTC's resolution and ordered the promulgation of the decision sentencing Cuison to imprisonment. Cuison then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writs of certiorari and mandamus. Whether the promulgation of the Court of Appeals' decision, including the penalty of imprisonment, is barred by double jeopardy.
Ruling
The petition is denied, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. Double costs against the petitioner.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of certiorari and mandamus: The Supreme Court held that the RTC judge committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in refusing to promulgate the Court of Appeals' decision in its entirety. The CA's decision clearly affirmed the trial court's judgment of conviction, including the penalty of imprisonment, and only modified the civil indemnity. The RTC's act of promulgating only the civil aspect and refusing to commit the accused to jail was a clear transgression of its duty. The Court emphasized that the RTC's resolution was tantamount to overruling a judicial pronouncement of the Supreme Court itself, which had affirmed the conviction. The CA's subsequent resolution clarifying its earlier decision was not an amendment but a restatement of its original intent, and the trial court's refusal to obey this clarification, despite the Supreme Court's dismissal of the petition questioning the CA's decision, constituted a persistent display of grave abuse of discretion. The issuance of a writ of mandamus was justified due to the trial court's refusal to perform its ministerial duty of promulgating the appellate court's decision in its entirety. On the issue of double jeopardy: The Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy was not violated. Legal jeopardy attaches only upon a valid indictment, before a competent court, after arraignment, with a valid plea entered, and the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused. In this case, the promulgation on April 4, 1995, was substantially incomplete and void because it only covered the civil aspect and omitted the criminal penalty. Therefore, the criminal cases had not yet been terminated, and the first jeopardy had not attached. The Court reiterated that the promulgation of the civil indemnity alone, without the criminal penalty, did not constitute a complete promulgation of the judgment. The RTC's act was an excess of jurisdiction, rendering the incomplete promulgation void. Consequently, since the criminal cases were not terminated, the defense of double jeopardy could not prosper.
Main Doctrine
The constitutional proscription of double jeopardy is not violated by a Court of Appeals order requiring the trial court to promulgate a decision sentencing the accused to imprisonment even if, earlier, the same decision has been promulgated in regard only to the payment of the modified civil indemnity arising from the same criminal act. Otherwise stated, the promulgation of only one part of the decision, i.e., the liability for civil indemnity, is not a bar to the subsequent promulgation of the other part, the imposition of the criminal accountability.