Tan, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Bienvenido Tan, Jr., then Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, was charged before the Sandiganbayan with violations of Section 3(e) and (g) of the Anti-Graft Law (R.A. 3019). The information alleged that Tan, along with other public officers and private individuals from San Miguel Corporation, conspired to cause undue injury to the Government by effecting a compromise of San Miguel Corporation's tax liabilities, totaling P302,951,048.93, for only P10,000,000.00, thereby giving unwarranted benefits to the corporation. Procedural History: Following arraignment, all accused, including petitioner, moved for a reinvestigation, which the Sandiganbayan granted. Upon reinvestigation, the Special Prosecutor found insufficient probable cause against petitioner's co-accused and moved to drop the charges against them, a motion granted by the Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion to quash the information, arguing that the charge of conspiracy was baseless with only one accused remaining. The Sandiganbayan denied this motion. The Petition: Petitioner elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, seeking to annul the Sandiganbayan's denial of his motion to quash. He argued that the information was no longer valid as the conspiracy charge had no basis with his co-accused dismissed, and that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion. The petition also contended that the Sandiganbayan erred in not amending the information and in not compelling the prosecution to charge his former co-accused, and that he should not be held liable as he merely relied on subordinates' recommendations.
Issue(s)
Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to quash the information. Whether the denial of the motion to quash, which was filed almost a year after the reinvestigation and after arraignment, was proper. Whether the dismissal of charges against petitioner's co-accused invalidated the information against him. Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion for reinvestigation after arraignment. Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to amend the information to delete the allegation of conspiracy. Whether the imputation of double jeopardy was valid. Whether the prosecution has the discretion to choose who to prosecute.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of certiorari and the denial of the motion to quash: The Supreme Court held that a special civil action for certiorari will not lie unless there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petitioner failed to file a motion for reconsideration, which is a prerequisite, unless exceptions apply, none of which were present. Furthermore, certiorari is not the proper remedy when a motion to dismiss (quash) an information is denied. The denial of such a motion is an interlocutory order and cannot be appealed until after a judgment or final order is rendered. The ordinary procedure is to proceed to trial and, if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal. The extraordinary remedy of certiorari can only be availed of if the denial constitutes grave abuse of discretion, which was not established in this case. On the timeliness of the motion to quash: The Court noted that the motion to dismiss (quash) was filed too late, almost a year after the reinvestigation and after arraignment. This contravened the rule that failure to assert grounds for a motion to quash before pleading is deemed waived, except for specific grounds like lack of jurisdiction or no offense charged, none of which applied here. The dropping of charges against a co-accused is not an exception. On the validity of the information despite dismissal of co-accused's charges: The Court found the information valid as it alleged all material facts and essential elements constituting the crimes under Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. Conspiracy is not an element of these offenses, and its allegation was merely to show how the accused incurred criminal liability. The subsequent dismissal of charges against co-accused did not render the information defective as to the petitioner, who remained charged. The allegation of conspiracy, if it became surplusage, did not invalidate the information against him. Petitioner was adequately informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. On the reinvestigation after arraignment: The Court found the petitioner's argument that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion by granting the reinvestigation after arraignment to be ridiculous. Petitioner himself prayed for reinvestigation, and it was not a valid reason to disregard the court's ruling on his own prayer. The petitioner was aware of the prior arraignment when he asked for reinvestigation. On the refusal to amend the information and double jeopardy: The Court dismissed the argument that the Sandiganbayan's refusal to amend the information to delete the conspiracy allegation would force a dismissal due to double jeopardy. The imputation of double jeopardy was premature as no amendment was made. Even if amended, the original information is superseded, and proceedings are continuous. The requisites for double jeopardy were not met, as petitioner had not been convicted, acquitted, or had the case dismissed without his consent. The dismissal of charges against co-accused did not operate as petitioner's acquittal. The court's refusal to amend precisely avoided placing petitioner in double jeopardy. On the refusal to amend the information and double jeopardy (continued): The Court stated that petitioner's defense of merely relying on subordinates' recommendations is a matter of defense that cannot be proven during proceedings on a motion to dismiss. On the discretion to prosecute: The Court affirmed that the discretion to prosecute rests with the prosecution's assessment of the evidence. The rule that all persons appearing responsible should be charged does not compel the prosecution to include those against whom no sufficient evidence exists. The Court consistently refrains from interfering with the Ombudsman's prosecutorial powers, as this independence is inherent in the office.
Main Doctrine
A petition for certiorari will not lie to challenge the denial of a motion to quash an information, as such denial is an interlocutory order that can only be reviewed on appeal after trial. Furthermore, the denial of a motion to quash based on the alleged non-existence of conspiracy due to the dismissal of charges against co-accused is not an error of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, as conspiracy is not an essential element of the offense charged under Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. 3019, and the information remains valid as to the remaining accused.