Pilapil v. Garchitorena
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The Municipality of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, received a donated ambulance from the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO). Petitioner, then congressman, received the ambulance but did not deliver it. The municipality, unaware of the donation, requested an ambulance from PCSO. Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francisco E. Garchitorena, upon learning of the municipality's request and the prior donation, informed the mayor. Petitioner eventually returned the ambulance to PCSO, which then donated a new one to Tigaon. Justice Garchitorena subsequently wrote to the Chief Justice and filed a letter-complaint against petitioner with the Ombudsman regarding the ambulance. Procedural History: An information for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 was filed against petitioner. Petitioner's motion to quash was denied, as was his motion for reconsideration. This Court, in G.R. No. 101978, affirmed the Sandiganbayan's denial, finding no grave abuse of discretion and dismissing petitioner's insinuations against Presiding Justice Garchitorena. After this decision, petitioner filed a motion for reinvestigation with the Sandiganbayan's Third Division, which was granted. Despite recommendations for dismissal, the Ombudsman disapproved them. Subsequently, the Special Prosecutor recommended dismissal for lack of a prima facie case, which was approved by the Ombudsman. A Motion to Withdraw Information was filed with the Third Division. Due to the inhibition of Justice del Rosario, the case was reassigned by the Presiding Justice to the Second Division. Petitioner moved to set aside this administrative order, alleging violation of R.A. No. 7975 and suspicion of partiality. He also moved for the voluntary inhibition of the Second Division Justices. The Second Division denied these motions, including the motion to withdraw the information, and set the arraignment. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied, leading to the present petition. The Petition: This special civil action for certiorari and prohibition seeks to annul the Sandiganbayan's denial of petitioner's motions, specifically: (1) the motion to set aside Administrative Order No. 79-96, which reassigned the case to the Second Division; (2) the motion for voluntary inhibition of the Second Division Justices; (3) the motion for reconsideration of the March 15, 1996 resolution and to strike out the comment of Presiding Justice Garchitorena; and (4) the Ombudsman's motion to withdraw the information. Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying these motions, thereby violating his right to due process and impartiality. He contends that the reassignment of the case was improper, the Second Division Justices could not be impartial given that the Presiding Justice was the complainant, and the denial of the motion to withdraw the information lacked valid grounds.
Issue(s)
Whether the Sandiganbayan may try Criminal Case No. 16672 where its presiding justice is a party thereto without violating the impartiality requirement in the due process clause. Whether Presiding Justice Garchitorena could assign the case to the Second Division upon voluntary inhibition of a justice from the Third Division, without violating R.A. No. 7975. Whether the Second Division could deny the motion to withdraw the information filed by the Ombudsman without any valid reason.
Ruling
The petition is DISMISSED. The Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to proceed with the arraignment of the petitioner and trial of Criminal Case No. 16672 with reasonable dispatch.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the Sandiganbayan trying the case where its presiding justice is a party: The Court reiterated that the act of bringing to the attention of appropriate officials possible transgressions of the law is an obligation of any official, including the highest official of the land. In G.R. No. 101978, this Court had already sustained the finding of probable cause against the petitioner and dismissed insinuations that Presiding Justice Garchitorena used his influence. The Court found that the Presiding Justice's role as a complainant/relator was approved by this Court previously, and he had no personal interest to protect. Therefore, the Sandiganbayan's proceeding with the case was not violative of impartiality. On the reassignment of the case to the Second Division: The Court found that Administrative Order No. 79-96, assigning the case to the Second Division, was validly issued pursuant to the Sandiganbayan's Revised Rules. Specifically, the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule III of these rules allowed for reassignment by raffle when a Chairman inhibits himself. Since the Presiding Justice was the complainant and could not sit in the Third Division, and the case could not be raffled to the First Division (where he was Chairman), reassignment to the Second Division was logical and proper. The Court distinguished this from R.A. No. 7975, which deals with situations where a quorum cannot be had due to legal disqualification, temporary disability, or vacancy, not voluntary inhibition. On the denial of the motion to withdraw the information: The Court affirmed the Sandiganbayan's denial, emphasizing that once an information is filed, any disposition rests in the sound discretion of the court. The Sandiganbayan, in denying the motion, made its own assessment of the evidence, consistent with the ruling in Martinez v. Court of Appeals, which mandates that a trial judge must be convinced of the insufficiency of evidence and cannot merely accept the prosecution's word. The Court found no arbitrary or despotic denial, noting that the Sandiganbayan considered the previous ruling of this Court in G.R. No. 101978. The Court also characterized the petitioner's numerous motions as dilatory tactics aimed at preventing arraignment and trial, noting that the petitioner had not come to court with clean hands.
Main Doctrine
The Sandiganbayan, in denying a motion to withdraw an information, must exercise its own independent assessment of the evidence, not merely accept the prosecution's word for its supposed insufficiency. Furthermore, dilatory tactics aimed at preventing arraignment and trial may be grounds for denying such motions.