Castillo-Co v. Barbers
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Governor Josie Castillo-Co of Quirino was charged by Congressman Junie Cua before the Office of the Ombudsman with violations of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and Articles 213 and 217 of the Revised Penal Code. The charges stemmed from alleged irregularities in the purchase of heavy equipment, including claims that the equipment was reconditioned instead of brand new, overpricing, lack of public bidding, lack of inspection, and advance payment prior to delivery. Procedural History: On July 4, 1997, an Order was issued by Director Emilio A. Gonzales III, approved by Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Jesus Guerrero, placing Governor Castillo-Co and Provincial Engineer Virgilio Ringor under preventive suspension for six (6) months. Separate motions for reconsideration filed by the Governor and the Engineer were denied in a Joint Order dated August 1, 1997. The Petition: Governor Castillo-Co filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, seeking to nullify the preventive suspension order. She alleged that the Deputy Ombudsman was not authorized to sign the order, that the issuance was hasty and selective, depriving her of due process, and that the conditions for preventive suspension were not met and the duration was excessive. This Court issued a temporary restraining order on August 26, 1997.
Issue(s)
Whether the Deputy Ombudsman is authorized to sign an order for preventive suspension. Whether the issuance of the preventive suspension order violated petitioner's right to due process. Whether the conditions required to sustain the preventive suspension were met and if the duration was excessive.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court is lifted.
Ratio Decidendi
On the authority of the Deputy Ombudsman to issue the suspension order: The Court held that Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770 and Section 9, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman clearly grant the Ombudsman or his Deputy the authority to preventively suspend an officer or employee. The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies independence between the Ombudsman and his Deputy in this regard. Therefore, the Deputy Ombudsman was authorized to sign the suspension order, and the contention that only the Ombudsman himself could sign it is without merit. The law does not require that only the Ombudsman himself may sign such an order. On the alleged violation of due process: The Court reiterated that preventive suspension is not a penalty but a preliminary administrative measure. It can be decreed after charges are brought and even before a hearing is conducted, as established in cases like Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole and Lastimosa v. Vasquez. The immediate issuance of the order, seven days after the complaint was filed, was deemed necessary to prevent further irregularities and was in consonance with Section 15 of RA 6770, which prioritizes complaints against high-ranking officials involving grave offenses. The Court found no evidence of a malicious conspiracy between the Deputy Ombudsman and the Congressman, upholding the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties. On the conditions for preventive suspension and its duration: The Court found that the conditions for preventive suspension were met. Firstly, the evidence of guilt was considered strong, a determination left to the discretion of the Ombudsman as per Buenaseda v. Flavier. Secondly, the charges involved dishonesty and grave misconduct (fraud against the public treasury and malversation), which warrant removal from service under Section 60(c) of the Local Government Code. Furthermore, the petitioner's continued stay in office could prejudice the case due to her access to public records and potential influence over witnesses. The six-month suspension period was within the limits prescribed by RA 6770 and also fell within the Ombudsman's discretion.
Main Doctrine
The Deputy Ombudsman, under Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770, is authorized to sign an order for preventive suspension, and such suspension, being a preliminary administrative measure, does not violate due process even if issued before a hearing.