Duterte v. Sandiganbayan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The Davao City government launched a Local Automation Project. A committee recommended the acquisition of Goldstar computers from Systems Plus, Inc. (SPI) for P11,056,810.00. The City Council approved the contract and appropriated funds. A downpayment of P1,748,521.58 was made to SPI. A "concerned citizen" filed a complaint with the Ombudsman, but no action was taken. A civil case was filed seeking the nullity of the resolutions, ordinances, and contract, which was later dismissed as moot and academic due to the contract's mutual rescission. Goldstar offered to cancel the contract, and the Sanggunian accepted, provided the downpayment was returned. The contract was rescinded on May 6, 1991, and the downpayment was refunded. A Commission on Audit (COA) Special Audit Report (SAR) No. 91-05 recommended rescission due to violations of PD 526, PD 1445, and other regulations, noting significant overpricing. The city government proceeded with computerization based on the National Computer Center's recommendation. An Anti-Graft League filed a complaint with the Ombudsman alleging violations of RA 3019, PD 1445, and other laws. Procedural History: The Ombudsman directed petitioners to comment on the civil case allegations and the COA SAR, but did not furnish them with affidavits substantiating the complaint. Petitioners adopted the comments of co-respondents. Four years later, petitioners received a memorandum recommending charges for violation of Sec. 3(g) of RA 3019, finding the contract "manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government," despite the elements of profit or loss being immaterial. An Information was filed before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash and Motion for Reconsideration, arguing deprivation of preliminary investigation, due process, and speedy disposition, and that no contract existed or was disadvantageous. The Sandiganbayan denied the motions, ruling that the motion for reconsideration with the Ombudsman remedied any defect in the preliminary investigation and that it was not empowered to authorize a reinvestigation. The Petition: Petitioners seek to set aside the Sandiganbayan's denial of their Motion to Quash and Motion for Reconsideration, alleging grave abuse of discretion. They claim they were deprived of their right to a preliminary investigation and due process due to inordinate delay. They also argue there is no basis to charge them under Sec. 3(g) of RA 3019 because petitioner Duterte acted in good faith with authority, the contract was rescinded, and thus not disadvantageous.
Issue(s)
Whether petitioners were deprived of their right to a preliminary investigation and due process. Whether there was an inordinate delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation, violating their right to speedy disposition of their case. Whether there is a sufficient basis in fact and in law to charge petitioners for violating Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
Ruling
The petition is GRANTED, and Criminal Case No. 23193 is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on September 4, 1997, is made PERMANENT.
Ratio Decidendi
On the deprivation of preliminary investigation and due process: The Court found that the preliminary investigation was not conducted in accordance with Administrative Order No. 07. Petitioners were directed to file a "comment" instead of a "counter-affidavit," and the order was not accompanied by affidavits substantiating the complaint as required by law. The civil complaint and the COA Special Audit Report, which were used as bases, were either dismissed or complied with prior to the complaint being filed with the Ombudsman. This procedural anomaly violated petitioners' constitutional right to due process. The Court emphasized that a preliminary investigation is a substantive right, not a mere formal one, designed to protect the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecution. On the inordinate delay in termination: The Court found that the four-year delay between petitioners filing their manifestation (February 18, 1992) and receiving the memorandum recommending charges (February 22, 1996) constituted an inordinate delay that infringed upon their constitutional right to a speedy disposition of their case. The Court noted that petitioners were unaware of the ongoing investigation due to the flawed preliminary investigation process. The Ombudsman's excuses for the delay, such as layers of review and meticulous scrutiny, were deemed unconvincing, especially since the contract had already been rescinded before the complaint was filed. On the sufficiency of basis for charging violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019: The Court held that the essential element of entering into a contract in behalf of the government was absent at the time the charges were pursued. The computerization contract was rescinded on May 6, 1991, prior to the COA report and the filing of the complaint with the Ombudsman. Therefore, when the Ombudsman issued its order and the information was filed, there was no longer a contract in existence. Consequently, the contract could not be considered "manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government" as required by Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, as it was rendered non-existent in contemplation of law.
Main Doctrine
The right to a preliminary investigation is a substantive right, and its denial, or a procedurally flawed preliminary investigation coupled with inordinate delay, violates the constitutional right to due process and speedy disposition of cases. Furthermore, a contract rescinded prior to the filing of charges cannot be the basis for a charge of entering into a contract manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.