Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections
NEW DOCTRINEFacts
The Antecedents: Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988. Upon the death of the incumbent mayor on September 2, 1989, Capco succeeded to the office of mayor by operation of law. He was subsequently elected mayor on May 11, 1992, and reelected on May 8, 1995. Procedural History: Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections. Benjamin U. Borja, Jr. sought Capco's disqualification, arguing that Capco would have served three consecutive terms as mayor by June 30, 1998. The COMELEC Second Division initially ruled in favor of Borja, disqualifying Capco. However, the COMELEC en banc, voting 5-2, reversed this decision, declaring Capco eligible to run, holding that succession to an office by operation of law does not count as a term for the purpose of the three-term limit. The Petition: This petition for certiorari seeks to set aside the COMELEC en banc's resolution and declare Capco disqualified from serving another term as mayor.
Issue(s)
Whether service as mayor by succession due to operation of law counts as a term for the purpose of the three-consecutive-term limit for elective local officials. Whether the constitutional provision limiting consecutive terms for elective local officials is solely aimed at preventing monopolization of political power or also at enhancing the people's freedom of choice.
Ruling
The petition is DISMISSED. The resolution of the Commission on Elections en banc declaring Jose T. Capco, Jr. eligible to run for mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether service as mayor by succession counts as a term for the three-consecutive-term limit: The Court held that service as a local elective official by succession to an office due to operation of law, without being elected to that specific office for the remainder of the term, does not count as a term served for the purpose of the three-consecutive-term limit. The constitutional provision and the Local Government Code refer to terms of office for which the official was elected. The Court emphasized that the purpose of the limitation is twofold: to prevent monopolization of political power and to enhance the people's freedom of choice. Counting service by succession would unduly restrict the people's freedom to choose their leaders. The Court distinguished this from the case of a Member of the House of Representatives elected to fill a vacancy, who serves a term for which they were elected. Furthermore, the Court noted the absence of a specific provision analogous to that for the Vice-President succeeding to the Presidency, which explicitly addresses service beyond a certain duration. The vice-mayor's distinct powers and functions as presiding officer of the sanggunian, separate from the mayorship, also support the view that succession is not a designed pursuit of the office. Therefore, Capco's service from September 2, 1989, to June 30, 1992, by succession, did not count as a term for the purpose of the three-term limit. On the purpose of the three-term limit: The Court clarified that the policy behind the three-term limit is not solely to prevent the monopolization of political power but also to enhance the freedom of choice of the people. The historical background of Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution shows that the framers were concerned with preserving the people's freedom of choice, rejecting proposals for absolute disqualification after a certain number of terms. They adopted a limit on consecutive service, allowing the people to decide through elections whether to reelect an official. To consider service by succession as a full term would unduly curtail this freedom of choice, as it would prevent the people from returning a potentially good official to office if they wished, even if it were only their third opportunity to elect him. The Court stressed that the people are ultimately the arbiters of who should govern them, and the term limit provision should not be interpreted in a way that unduly restricts their right to choose.
Main Doctrine
Service as a local elective official by succession to an office due to operation of law, without being elected to that specific office for the remainder of the term, does not count as a term served for the purpose of the three-consecutive-term limit under the Constitution and the Local Government Code. The limitation applies to terms for which the official was elected.