Yasay v. Desierto
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Donato Teodoro, Sr., as President and Chairman of Donsol Development & Commercial Corporation and D.B. Teodoro Securities, Inc., filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Perfecto R. Yasay, Jr. (petitioner) with the Ombudsman. The charges included Estafa under the Revised Penal Code and violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Teodoro alleged that petitioner, acting as President and Chairman of the SEC and SEC Building Condominium Corp. (SBCC), misrepresented that the condominium units G-02 and G-03, owned by Teodoro's corporations and leased to Mrs. Emily Mendoza, would be leased by SEC and SBCC for use as a "display" area. Despite Teodoro accommodating petitioner by convincing Mrs. Mendoza to vacate at his expense, petitioner failed to execute a lease contract and pay rentals. Petitioner, in his counter-affidavit, claimed the area was a common area, not a private unit, and that Mrs. Mendoza's structure was a fire hazard. He denied any lease agreement and alleged Teodoro's claims were false. Procedural History: The Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau recommended filing criminal and administrative charges against petitioner and his preventive suspension. On July 23, 1998, the Ombudsman issued an order placing petitioner under preventive suspension for ninety (90) days without pay. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, assailing this order and seeking dismissal of the administrative charges. He also filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying to lift the suspension and an extension order issued by the Ombudsman on October 23, 1998, which extended his preventive suspension for another ninety (90) days. The Petition: Petitioner sought the nullification of the Ombudsman's July 22, 1998 order placing him under preventive suspension and the dismissal of the administrative charges. He also sought to enjoin the enforcement of the October 23, 1998 extension order.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the administrative case. Whether the respondent Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion in giving due course to the administrative charges against petitioner. Whether the respondent Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion in issuing the order placing petitioner under preventive suspension. Whether the extension order dated October 23, 1998, extending the preventive suspension, is valid.
Ruling
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition insofar as it assailed the July 22, 1998 Order and prayed for the dismissal of the administrative case, finding no grave abuse of discretion by the Ombudsman. However, the Court set aside the Extension Order dated October 23, 1998, thereby lifting the second ninety-day preventive suspension imposed upon petitioner, holding it to be immediately executory.
Ratio Decidendi
On the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman: The Court found petitioner's attempt to distinguish his role as Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from his role as President of the SEC Building Condominium Corporation (SBCC) to be "vacuous" and "hairsplitting." The Court noted that petitioner's position in SBCC was inseparable from his title as Chairman of the SEC, and his acts as SBCC president were viewed in light of his functions as SEC chairman. Petitioner himself, in his counter-affidavit, asserted he was acting in his capacity as Chairman and President of SEC and SBCC, respectively, and that he acted "in the discharge of his official functions." The use of the SEC letterhead and his signature as "Chairman" further supported the conclusion that his actions were connected to his governmental role, thus falling within the Ombudsman's jurisdiction. On the grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the charges: The Court held that petitioner was raising matters of defense, such as acting as a member of a collegial body, which are best ventilated before the Office of the Ombudsman. Furthermore, the Court stated that these arguments were not proper in a certiorari proceeding, as the Court cannot re-examine the evidence to determine if it supports the administrative charges. Under R.A. No. 6770, the Supreme Court can only hear appeals on pure questions of law, not on factual findings or sufficiency of evidence. On the grave abuse of discretion in issuing the preventive suspension order: The Court found no merit in petitioner's arguments. The Ombudsman is empowered by R.A. No. 6770 to preventively suspend an official if the evidence of guilt is strong, the charge involves dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, or neglect, the charge warrants removal, or the respondent's continued stay prejudices the case. The Ombudsman found these elements present, noting strong evidence of grave misconduct and gross dishonesty, serious offenses warranting dismissal, and the urgency to prevent prejudice to the investigation. The Court deferred to the Ombudsman's judgment on whether the evidence of guilt was strong, as this is a matter left to the Ombudsman's determination, absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. On the validity of the extension order: The Court ruled that the extension order was invalid. Section 9, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman mandates automatic reinstatement if the administrative investigation is not terminated within the suspension period, unless the delay is due to the respondent's fault, negligence, or attributable cause. The Court found that petitioner's opting for a formal hearing was not a cause for delay contemplated by the rules, distinguishing it from actions like absences from hearings or requests for postponement. The Court also disagreed that the filing of the certiorari petition, cases against the Ombudsman, or motions for inhibition and suspension of proceedings caused the delay, as these were either independent actions or were resolved within the initial suspension period.
Main Doctrine
A motion for reconsideration is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy that must be availed of before filing a petition for certiorari, even if the order is immediately executory. An extension of preventive suspension is invalid if the delay in the investigation is not attributable to the respondent.