People v. Dela Rosa
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On December 9, 1986, Rodolfo dela Rosa, Antonio dela Rosa, Cresencio Reyes, and Rodolfo Quimson surrendered to Kagawad Valeriano Rigor, claiming they wanted to lead a new life and informing him that Benjamin Nano, alias Kumander Tamang, was shot by one of them. They had with them a shotgun (Exhibit A) and a bag with dynamite sticks (Exhibit C to C-7). Kagawad Rigor reported this to the police. Upon arrival of the police, the shotgun and dynamite were shown to them. The accused, except Rodolfo Quimson, were brought to the PC Headquarters. The following day, Cresencio Reyes informed the police about two more shotguns buried in Sitio Tebel Patar, which were then unearthed by the police (Exhibits B and D). Procedural History: An information for illegal possession of firearms and explosives under Presidential Decree No. 1866 was filed. Initially, the accused pleaded not guilty, then withdrew it for a plea of guilt, which was later withdrawn. Cresencio Reyes pleaded guilty to a lesser offense and became a witness. Trial proceeded against Rodolfo dela Rosa, Antonio dela Rosa, and Rodolfo Quimson. The trial court convicted Rodolfo dela Rosa, Antonio dela Rosa, and Rodolfo Quimson. Antonio dela Rosa did not appeal. Rodolfo Quimson escaped detention. Rodolfo dela Rosa appealed his conviction. The Petition: Rodolfo dela Rosa appealed his conviction for illegal possession of firearms and explosives, contending that the trial court erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue(s)
Whether accused-appellant Rodolfo dela Rosa was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of firearms and explosives under Presidential Decree No. 1866, considering the elements of possession and intent. Whether the prosecution sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt the lack of authority or license to possess the firearms, a negative averment. Whether the possession of the firearms and explosives by Rodolfo dela Rosa was merely temporary, incidental, and for the purpose of surrender, thus lacking the requisite animus possidendi, and the implications of such possession.
Ruling
The Supreme Court acquitted accused-appellant Rodolfo dela Rosa, finding that the prosecution failed to establish the elements of illegal possession beyond reasonable doubt. The Court ordered his immediate release from detention, unless held for other offenses.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of illegal possession of firearms and explosives: The Court held that for a conviction under Presidential Decree No. 1866, the prosecution must prove two elements: (i) possession of a firearm, and (ii) lack of authority or license to possess it. Furthermore, the Court clarified that mere physical or constructive possession is insufficient; there must be animus possidendi, or the intent to possess the firearm. The Court distinguished between criminal intent and intent to possess, stating that while the former is not necessary for malum prohibitum offenses, the latter is essential. In this case, it was undisputed that Rodolfo dela Rosa and his companions surrendered the firearms and explosives to Kagawad Rigor even before the police arrived. This act clearly indicated an intention to surrender the items, not to possess them unlawfully. The possession was described as harmless, temporary, and incidental for the purpose of turning the items over to the authorities. Therefore, the element of animus possidendi was not established. On the issue of lack of license: The Court reiterated that the prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt the lack of license, which is a negative averment. The Court found the evidence presented by the prosecution insufficient to discharge this burden. The preliminary examination of Pfc. Cipriano P. Castillo, where the accused stated they had no license, was deemed insufficient, especially since Rodolfo dela Rosa repudiated his extrajudicial statement. The Court cited People v. Solayao (262 SCRA 256), emphasizing that an extrajudicial admission alone is not enough, and suggesting that a certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit would have been more appropriate. Mere suspicion that the accused illegally possessed the ammunitions to further subversive activities was not sufficient to substitute for the required quantum of proof. On the nature of possession: The Court applied the principle established in People v. Estoista (93 Phil. 647) and People v. Remereta (98 Phil. 413) that temporary, incidental, or casual possession of firearms is not punishable. The possession in this case, where the accused immediately surrendered the items to a barangay official, was considered to be of this nature. This was contrasted with cases like People v. Leo Lian, where the accused's claim of intending to surrender was found to be feigned. In the present case, the appellant's intention to surrender was clear from the outset and was successfully executed. Therefore, the possession, even if physical or constructive, lacked the necessary animus possidendi to warrant a conviction under Presidential Decree No. 1866.
Main Doctrine
Possession of firearms without a license is punishable under Presidential Decree No. 1866, but mere temporary, incidental, or casual possession for the purpose of surrender, without animus possidendi (intent to possess), does not constitute illegal possession. The prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt both the possession and the lack of license.