Bunag v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Private respondents were instituted as tenants on a parcel of agricultural land in 1964, later changing their relationship to leasehold in 1976. Petitioners, the son-in-law and daughter of the landowner, took over the land on November 4, 1985, plowing it over the protest of private respondents. Procedural History: Private respondents filed a complaint to recover possession, and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered judgment in their favor on November 15, 1988, ordering their reinstatement as leaseholders, vacation of the premises by petitioners and others, payment of unrealized produce, attorney's fees, and making the injunction permanent. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed this decision, which became final and executory on May 21, 1990. A writ of execution was issued, but petitioners refused to remove their house. Private respondents moved for an order of demolition, which the RTC granted on June 24, 1991. Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA assailing the demolition order, but the CA dismissed their action. The Petition: Petitioners seek review of the CA decision, arguing that their house is not on the disputed land, that the demolition order varied the original decision, and that a DAR complaint for eviction constituted a supervening event justifying recall of the demolition order.
Issue(s)
Whether petitioners are estopped from claiming their house is not on the disputed land. Whether the order of demolition varied the original decision. Whether the filing of a complaint for eviction in the DAR constitutes a supervening event justifying the recall of the order of demolition.
Ruling
The petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of estoppel: The Court held that petitioners are estopped from claiming their house is not on the disputed land because this issue was raised for the first time on appeal. They failed to raise this claim in the trial court despite being notified of the motion for demolition and the hearing thereon. Furthermore, in a special civil action for certiorari, the inquiry is limited to whether the public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and questions of fact are generally not permitted. The petitioners' bare assertion, without supporting evidence, was insufficient to warrant a review of this factual issue. On whether the order of demolition varied the original decision: The Court ruled that the order of demolition did not vary the original decision. A judgment for the delivery or restitution of property requires placing the prevailing party in possession, which may involve ousting the defendant. Rule 39, Section 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court specifically provides for the removal of improvements upon special order of the court after due hearing, if the judgment debtor fails to remove them within a reasonable time. In this case, petitioners were given notice and an opportunity to be heard on the motion for demolition, and they failed to oppose it. Thus, there was compliance with the rules. On whether the DAR complaint constitutes a supervening event: The Court found no merit in this contention. A party cannot create an event to excuse noncompliance with a final decision. The complaint filed by petitioners with the DAR was dismissed, and they were aware of this dismissal when they filed the present case. Refiling the complaint was deemed a mere attempt to delay the execution of the final judgment. The Court reiterated that orders of execution and demolition are generally not appealable, and a writ of certiorari will only lie upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion by the trial court, which was not sufficiently demonstrated by the petitioners.
Main Doctrine
An order of demolition issued pursuant to a final and executory judgment, which seeks to enforce the restitution of property, cannot be set aside through a special civil action for certiorari unless it is shown that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the same. Issues not raised in the trial court are deemed waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.