People v. Nitafan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Three criminal informations for violation of Section 4 of Central Bank Circular No. 960, as amended, in relation to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, were filed against Imelda R. Marcos before the RTC of Pasig. These informations were later consolidated and re-raffled to Branch 52 of the RTC of Manila, presided over by respondent Judge David G. Nitafan, and re-numbered. Procedural History: Respondent Judge Nitafan, motu proprio, issued orders requiring the prosecution to show cause why the informations should not be dismissed. The grounds cited were the alleged violation of the accused's right against ex post facto law (for one information) and double jeopardy (for the other two). The prosecution filed motions for consolidation and a motion to inhibit the judge. The judge denied the motion for consolidation and subsequently dismissed the criminal cases on the grounds of ex post facto law and double jeopardy, and also citing political vendetta. The prosecution's motions for reconsideration were denied. The Petition: The People of the Philippines, through the Panel of Prosecutors, filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, questioning the authority of the respondent judge to motu proprio initiate dismissals of criminal informations without a motion from the accused.
Issue(s)
Whether a judge can motu proprio initiate the dismissal of a criminal information or complaint without a motion to that effect being filed by the accused. Whether the grounds of ex post facto law and double jeopardy were properly invoked by the respondent judge in dismissing the informations. Whether the dismissal orders violated the constitutional rights of the prosecution and the accused.
Ruling
The petition is GRANTED. The orders dated January 20, 1990, August 7, 1992, August 10, 1992, and September 7, 1992, issued by respondent judge, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi
On the authority of a judge to dismiss motu proprio: The Supreme Court held that the Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly indicate that the right to file a motion to quash an information belongs exclusively to the accused. Section 1 of Rule 117 states that the accused may move to quash at any time before entering a plea. Furthermore, Section 8 of Rule 117 provides that failure of the accused to assert grounds for a motion to quash before pleading constitutes a waiver, except for specific grounds like lack of jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that there is nothing in the rules authorizing a judge to motu proprio initiate a motion to quash. Such an action would pre-judge the case, take sides with the accused, and violate the right to a hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal, thereby contravening due process. The judge, in initiating the dismissal, effectively acts as counsel for the accused and the judge simultaneously, which is impermissible. On the grounds of ex post facto law and double jeopardy: The Court found that the grounds invoked by the respondent judge were not applicable. Regarding the ex post facto law argument, the Court noted that Central Bank Circular No. 960 was not directly assailed as unconstitutional, and neither the accused nor the Solicitor-General challenged its validity. The Court reiterated the principle that it, and lower courts, will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute or rule unless directly assailed in an appropriate action. Concerning double jeopardy, the Court explained that the three requisites for double jeopardy (attachment of first jeopardy, valid termination of the first jeopardy, and second jeopardy for the same offense) were not met. The cases pending before Branch 26-Manila were still ongoing, meaning no first jeopardy had attached or been validly terminated. Therefore, prosecuting the accused under the informations before the respondent judge's sala would not violate her right against double jeopardy. On the violation of due process: The Court found that the respondent judge's actions, by motu proprio initiating dismissals and issuing lengthy disquisitions supporting his actions, effectively turned him into an advocate for the accused. This conduct undermined the neutrality expected of a magistrate and violated the fundamental right to a hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal, which is a cornerstone of due process for both the prosecution and the accused. The judge's pre-judgment of the case and his assumption of the role of counsel for the accused were clear violations of due process.
Main Doctrine
A judge cannot motu proprio initiate the dismissal of a criminal information or complaint without a motion filed by the accused, as this violates the accused's right to a hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal and infringes upon due process. The right to file a motion to quash is lodged solely with the accused.