Cora Vergara v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Private respondents filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money with damages against petitioner alleging that petitioner's husband borrowed a sum evidenced by a promissory note and later died, and that petitioner executed a promissory note undertaking to pay the indebtedness. The promissory notes were attached to the complaint. The complaint was instituted on November 12, 1993. Procedural History: Summons was received by petitioner on December 15, 1993. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on January 14, 1994, invoking Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, arguing the money claim should have been recovered in estate proceedings under Rule 87. The Regional Trial Court denied the motion to dismiss by order dated February 7, 1994 and required petitioner to file her answer within ten (10) days; a motion for reconsideration was denied on March 7, 1994. Petitioner sought certiorari relief in the Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTC's orders in CA-G.R. SP No. 33889. Petitioner then filed the instant petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court. The Petition: Petitioner urged that (a) the lower courts erred in sustaining denial/deferral of her motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, and (b) the courts erred in shortening her period to answer from fifteen (15) days to ten (10) days.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the Regional Trial Court's denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the Regional Trial Court's order reducing petitioner's period to file an answer from fifteen (15) days to ten (10) days.
Ruling
The petition is DENIED. The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated July 27, 1994 and November 7, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33889 are AFFIRMED. The RTC did not commit reversible error in denying the motion to dismiss or in setting a ten-day period to answer; petitioner failed to avail herself of relief from default under Rule 18.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Court held that a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action must be decided solely on the allegations of the complaint and not on defenses or facts extraneous to the complaint. The Court applied established precedents, observing that to sustain such a motion the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist under any state of facts which could be proved within the allegations; mere defects, ambiguity, or defenses are insufficient. The Court found that the complaint alleged the existence of a loan, a promissory note by the husband, and a promissory note by petitioner herself, which on their face sufficed to allege a cause of action for recovery of money. The Court stressed that petitioner's contentions regarding lack of assumption of obligation or novation are affirmative defenses that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss and are properly litigated at trial. Applying Parañaque King Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and Drilon v. Court of Appeals, the Court concluded that dismissal was not warranted because the complaint, on its face, disclosed an actionable claim and therefore the denial of the motion to dismiss was correct. On Issue 2: The Court held that Rule 16, Section 4 expressly provides that when a motion to dismiss is denied or its determination deferred, the movant shall file his answer within the period prescribed by Rule 11 computed from the time he received notice, "unless the court provides a different period." The Court applied Matute v. Court of Appeals and BA Finance Corp. v. Pineda to affirm that a court may fix a different period to answer; it found the ten-day period reasonable under the circumstances. The Court observed that petitioner had substantial time overall (recorded as 103 days from receipt of summons to filing of answer) and that petitioner received notice of the denial and deferment, yet did not seek relief from the order of default under Rule 18, Section 3. The Court emphasized that procedural remedies exist to set aside default for excusable neglect or meritorious defense and that petitioner did not avail herself of those remedies. Consequently, the shortening of the answer period and the declaration of default were not reversible errors given the totality of the circumstances and the court's discretion under Rule 16, Section 4.
Main Doctrine
A motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action must be determined from the face of the complaint alone; defenses extraneous to the pleadings cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss. Under Rule 16, Section 4, the court may provide a different period to answer than the reglementary 15 days and such modification is permissible and reasonable under the circumstances.