Reyes v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The Sangguniang Bayan of San Juan, Metro Manila, enacted several tax ordinances: Ordinance No. 87 imposing a municipal tax on printing and publication businesses; Ordinance No. 91 imposing a transfer tax on real property; Ordinance No. 95 imposing a social housing tax on real estate property; Ordinance No. 100 imposing new business tax rates; and Ordinance No. 101 levying an annual ad valorem tax on real property and an additional tax for the special education fund. Petitioners challenged these ordinances, alleging they were enacted without prior public hearings, thereby violating due process. Procedural History: Petitioners initially appealed the tax ordinances to the Department of Justice on May 21, 1993, assailing their constitutionality due to the alleged lack of public hearings. The Secretary of Justice dismissed this appeal on June 10, 1993, finding it was filed out of time, as it exceeded the thirty-day period from the ordinances' effectivity as stipulated in Section 187 of R.A. No. 7160. Subsequently, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Secretary's decision. A motion for reconsideration was also denied, leading to the present petition. The Petition: Petitioners seek review of the Court of Appeals' decision, raising three main questions: (1) whether the tax ordinances are void for lack of mandatory public hearings, constituting a deprivation of property without due process; (2) whether Section 187 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which sets a thirty-day period for appealing tax ordinances, is an absurdum when the ordinance itself is alleged to be void from inception; and (3) whether the constitutionality of a tax ordinance can be questioned at any time. The core arguments are that the failure to hold public hearings renders the ordinances void and that the thirty-day appeal period under Section 187 should not apply to ordinances enacted without due process.
Issue(s)
Whether the appeal to the Secretary of Justice was filed out of time under Section 187 of the Local Government Code of 1991. Whether the lack of mandatory public hearings rendered the tax ordinances void. Whether the constitutional validity of Section 187 of the Local Government Code could be raised for the first time on appeal.
Ruling
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Court emphasized that Section 187 of Republic Act No. 7160, also known as the Local Government Code of 1991, explicitly requires a dissatisfied taxpayer to file an appeal with the Secretary of Justice within thirty days from the effectivity of the tax ordinance. This thirty-day period is a mandatory prerequisite before seeking redress in a competent court. The Court reasoned that such statutory periods are designed to prevent delays and enhance the orderly discharge of judicial and administrative functions. In the context of taxation, any delay in implementing revenue measures is detrimental to the public interest as it hampers the local government's ability to deliver basic services. Consequently, the petitioners' failure to appeal within the prescribed timeframe was deemed fatal to their cause of action. On Issue 2: Regarding the alleged lack of public hearings, the Court applied the principle established in Figuerres v. Court of Appeals, which holds that ordinances enjoy a presumption of validity. While Section 186 of the Local Government Code requires public hearings prior to the enactment of tax ordinances, the burden of proving that such hearings were not conducted lies with the party making the assertion. The Court noted that the lack of a public hearing is a negative allegation essential to the petitioners' cause of action, thus requiring them to provide evidence to rebut the presumption of regularity in official conduct. Since the petitioners failed to present any evidence beyond bare assertions, the Court was constrained to uphold the legality of the ordinances. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the regularity of the enactment of an officially promulgated statute cannot be impeached by parol evidence or oral testimony from interested parties. On Issue 3: On the question of the constitutionality of Section 187, the Court reiterated the long-standing rule that the constitutionality of an act of Congress will not be passed upon unless it is raised at the first opportunity. The issue must be properly presented in an appropriate case and must be necessary to the determination of the case, serving as the 'lis mota.' In this instance, the petitioners failed to specifically raise, insist upon, or adequately argue the constitutional invalidity of Section 187 in the lower proceedings. The Court found no genuine necessity to dwell on this issue given that the case could be resolved on other grounds, specifically the failure to meet the prescriptive period and the failure to prove the lack of public hearings. Therefore, the Court declined to conduct further constitutional scrutiny of the provision.
Main Doctrine
The thirty-day period provided under Section 187 of the Local Government Code of 1991 for appealing the constitutionality or legality of a tax ordinance to the Secretary of Justice is mandatory. This requirement is a prerequisite before seeking judicial redress, intended to prevent delays in revenue collection essential for local government operations. Furthermore, municipal ordinances are presumed valid; thus, a party alleging a procedural defect, such as the lack of mandatory public hearings, bears the burden of proving such a negative allegation with clear evidence.