People v. Rebamontan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On April 22, 1994, at around 6:00 PM, in Barangay No. 3, Poblacion San Julian, Eastern Samar, Hilario Rebamontan, alias "Ayong," allegedly attacked and stabbed Pedro Cagrado, Jr. with a "depang" (a sharp bladed weapon), inflicting fatal injuries. The prosecution presented eyewitness Lucas Calinaya, who testified that Rebamontan was initially behind Cagrado, Jr. and stabbed him as the victim turned, unaware of the impending attack. Cagrado, Jr. ran towards Lucas and his companions, fell, and died. Rebamontan allegedly gave chase. SPO4 Nandino Doligon responded to the scene and later arrested Rebamontan. Procedural History: The Information charged Rebamontan with murder, alleging intent to kill, evident premeditation, and treachery. Rebamontan pleaded not guilty. The Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch I of Borongan, Eastern Samar, found Rebamontan guilty of murder and sentenced him to death, finding treachery as a qualifying circumstance but disbelieving self-defense and voluntary surrender. The RTC noted the absence of evident premeditation. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court for automatic review. The Petition: Accused-appellant Rebamontan abandoned his self-defense theory and assailed the RTC's appreciation of treachery, its disregard of voluntary surrender, and its imposition of the death penalty.
Issue(s)
Whether treachery was present in the commission of the crime. Whether voluntary surrender should have been appreciated as a mitigating circumstance. Whether the death penalty was the proper imposable penalty.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction for murder but modified the penalty. The assailed Decision was affirmed, with the modification that appellant is sentenced to reclusion perpetua, instead of death. No pronouncement as to costs.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of treachery: The Court found treachery to be present. The eyewitness testimony indicated that Rebamontan initially positioned himself behind the victim, and the stabbing occurred as the victim turned, unaware of the attack. The Court emphasized that treachery requires two conditions: (1) the employment of means, method, or form of execution that ensures the offender's safety from the victim's defense or retaliation, and (2) the conscious and deliberate adoption of such means. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack, which gave the victim no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, established treachery, even if the victim was facing the assailant at the precise moment of the blow. The Court cited that even a frontal assault can be treacherous if it is sudden and unexpected, preventing any defense. On the issue of voluntary surrender: The Court ruled that voluntary surrender was not present. The evidence showed that police officer Nandino Doligon actively searched for the accused-appellant after receiving information from eyewitnesses. The accused-appellant was apprehended on Burgos Street after being pointed out by people in the area. The Court clarified that for voluntary surrender to be mitigating, it must be spontaneous and unconditional, showing an intent to submit to authorities. The mere fact that the accused-appellant did not resist arrest or admitted to the stabbing when confronted by the police officer, after being sought out, did not constitute voluntary surrender as his arrest was already imminent. On the issue of the proper penalty: The Court held that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, prescribes the penalty for murder as reclusion perpetua to death. The Court reiterated the elementary rule that when two indivisible penalties are prescribed for an offense and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Since no generic aggravating circumstances were found, and voluntary surrender was not appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should have been imposed, not death. The Court found no generic aggravating circumstance present in the commission of the murder.
Main Doctrine
The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. In the absence of generic aggravating circumstances, and with no mitigating circumstances, the lesser indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be applied, not the death penalty. Treachery may be present even if the victim was facing the assailant at the moment of the blow, if the attack was sudden and unexpected, ensuring the offender's safety.