De Asis v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: This case concerns a claim for maintenance and support filed by a minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, represented by her mother and legal guardian, Vircel D. Andres, against the petitioner, Manuel de Asis, whom the minor alleges to be her father. The initial action sought to compel the petitioner to provide financial support for the minor. The petitioner, in turn, denied paternity and consequently denied any obligation to provide support. Procedural History: The initial complaint for maintenance and support, Civil Case No. Q-88-935, was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Following a manifestation by the plaintiff's counsel that pursuing the claim would be futile due to the defendant's denial of paternity, and an agreement that the defendant would withdraw his counterclaim, the case was dismissed with prejudice by the trial court. Subsequently, a second complaint for maintenance and support, Civil Case No. C-16107, was filed by the same minor, represented by her mother, in the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City. The petitioner moved to dismiss this second case, arguing res judicata based on the prior dismissal. The trial court denied this motion, holding that res judicata does not apply to actions for support because future support cannot be renounced by law. The Court of Appeals affirmed this denial, leading to the present petition. The Petition: The petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss. He contends that the prior dismissal of Civil Case Q-88-935 with prejudice, based on a manifestation effectively admitting the lack of filiation and a mutual agreement to dismiss, should bar the subsequent action for support under the principle of res judicata. The petitioner asserts that the manifestation and dismissal with prejudice conclusively established the lack of paternity, negating the right to claim support.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in upholding the denial of the motion to dismiss. Whether the second action for support (Civil Case No. C-16107) is barred by res judicata due to the dismissal with prejudice of the first action (Civil Case No. Q-88-935), considering the principles governing support and the prohibition against compromising future support. Whether the manifestation in the first case, admitting the futility of claiming support due to denied paternity, constitutes a binding admission that bars the subsequent action for support, and the effect of dismissal with prejudice in the context of support actions.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The second action for support may prosper notwithstanding the dismissal of the first case.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of grave abuse of discretion: This issue was not addressed in the provided ratio decidendi. The provided text focuses solely on issues related to support, res judicata, and paternity. On the applicability of res judicata to actions for support and the effect of the manifestation in the first case: The Court reiterated that the right to receive support is founded on the need of the recipient to maintain existence and cannot be renounced, transmitted to a third person, or compensated. Future support cannot be the subject of a compromise. These principles are enshrined in Articles 301 and 2035 of the Civil Code. The rationale is that allowing renunciation would be akin to sanctioning suicide or the conversion of the recipient into a public burden, which is contrary to public policy. Therefore, any agreement or manifestation that attempts to waive or renounce future support is void and cannot serve as a basis for res judicata. The manifestation by the respondent's mother in the first case, acknowledging the futility of claiming support due to the petitioner's denial of paternity, amounted to a renunciation of the right to support. This renunciation, being contrary to law and public policy, is void and does not sever the vinculum that gives the minor the right to claim support. Furthermore, the agreement to dismiss the case with prejudice, conditioned on the withdrawal of the counterclaim, was in the nature of a compromise regarding future support, which is expressly prohibited by Article 2035 of the Civil Code. On the nature of paternity and filiation as a judicial matter and the effect of dismissal with prejudice: While it is true that filiation and/or paternity must be established to claim support, this is a relationship that must be judicially established by the court. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Even if the admission made by counsel in the first case were binding upon the respondent, it is at most evidentiary and does not conclusively establish the lack of filiation, which remains a matter for judicial determination. The Court clarified that a dismissal with prejudice, in the context of support, does not automatically bar a subsequent action for support if the dismissal was predicated on a void agreement or compromise. Citing Advincula vs. Advincula, the Court held that the right to support can be reiterated as needs arise, and a previous dismissal not based on an adjudication of the merits, especially if it involves prohibited compromises, cannot bar a subsequent action. The cause of action for support accrues when the needs of the recipient arise.
Main Doctrine
The right to receive support cannot be renounced, transmitted to a third person, or compensated, and future support cannot be the subject of a compromise. Consequently, an action for support cannot be barred by res judicata, even if a previous case for support was dismissed with prejudice, as such dismissal, if based on a compromise or renunciation, is void and cannot prejudice the right of the recipient to future support.