Tupaz v. Ulep
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petronila C. Tupaz and her late husband, as corporate officers of El Oro Engravers Corporation, were charged with nonpayment of deficiency corporate income tax for 1979. The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) dismissed the information for lack of jurisdiction. Subsequently, two identical informations were filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Quezon City, Branches 105 and 86. Procedural History: The MeTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC denied the prosecution's motion for reconsideration. Two identical informations were filed with the RTC, Quezon City, Branches 105 and 86. Accused posted bail. A motion to dismiss one of the informations due to identity was denied. Jose J. Tupaz, Jr. died. The RTC granted a petition for reinvestigation. The prosecution stated no new issues were raised. Accused was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The prosecution filed a motion for leave to file an amended information to expressly allege the date of the offense, which was granted. The amended information was admitted, but the accused was not re-arraigned, as the amendment was considered a matter of form. Accused filed a motion for leave to file and admit motion for reinvestigation, which was granted. The RTC ordered the withdrawal of the information in Branch 86 due to its identity with the one in Branch 105. The prosecution filed a motion to withdraw the information in Branch 105, believing it was for a different offense (contractor's tax). The RTC granted the withdrawal and dismissed the case. Subsequently, the prosecution filed a motion to reinstate the information in Branch 105, citing palpable mistake and excusable neglect. Over the accused's objections, the RTC granted the motion and ordered the information reinstated. The accused filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The Petition: Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari with application for temporary restraining order, seeking to enjoin the RTC from trying the criminal case and to nullify the order reviving the information, arguing that the offense has prescribed or that she would be exposed to double jeopardy.
Issue(s)
Whether the offense of nonpayment of deficiency corporate income tax for 1979 has prescribed; and whether the assessment was made within the prescribed period. Whether the reinstatement of the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321 constitutes double jeopardy. Whether the amendment of the information was substantial and would place the petitioner in double jeopardy.
Ruling
The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition, enjoining the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 105, from trying Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321 and ordering its dismissal.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of prescription of the offense and assessment: The Court agreed with the Solicitor General that the offense has not prescribed. The violation of failure to pay deficiency income tax occurs after the service of notice and demand for payment of the deficiency taxes and the finality of the assessment. In this case, the notice of assessment was issued on July 16, 1984. Since the taxpayer did not protest within thirty days, the assessment became final and unappealable on August 16, 1984. The criminal action was instituted on June 8, 1989, which was within the five (5) year prescriptive period from the finality of the assessment, as provided under Section 340 (now 281) of the Tax Code. The Court clarified that Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply as provisions on the period of assessment are not penal in nature. The Court held that the shortened period of three (3) years under Batas Pambansa Blg. 700, effective April 5, 1984, does not apply to the petitioner's case. BP Blg. 700 specifically states that the shortened period applies to assessments and collections beginning taxable year 1984. Since the deficiency income tax was for taxable year 1979, the five (5) year period of assessment under the old law applied. The tax return was filed in April 1980, and the assessment was made on July 16, 1984, which was within the five (5) year period from the last day of filing the return or from the date the return is filed, whichever comes later. Therefore, the assessment was made within the prescribed period. On the issue of double jeopardy regarding reinstatement: The Court sustained the petitioner's contention that the reinstatement of the information would expose her to double jeopardy. The Court reiterated that an accused is placed in double jeopardy if tried again for an offense for which they have been convicted, acquitted, or the indictment was dismissed without their consent. In this case, a valid complaint was filed, the accused pleaded not guilty, and the case was dismissed at the instance of the prosecution without the accused-petitioner's express consent. The Court emphasized that such consent cannot be implied or presumed and must be expressed. As the consent was not expressly given, the dismissal was final and with prejudice. Consequently, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the information, violating the petitioner's constitutional right against double jeopardy. On the issue of double jeopardy regarding amendment: The Court also noted that the amendment to the information was a matter of form and did not require re-arraignment, thus not constituting a new jeopardy.
Main Doctrine
The reinstatement of an information dismissed without the express consent of the accused, after a valid complaint has been filed and the accused has pleaded not guilty, constitutes grave abuse of discretion and violates the constitutional right against double jeopardy.