People v. De Vera
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On June 8, 1992, Frederick Capulong y Dizon was shot and killed in Quezon City. An Amended Information charged Edwin De Vera y Garcia, Roderick Garcia y Galamgam, Kenneth Florendo, and Elmer Castro with murder, alleging conspiracy, evident premeditation, treachery, and use of superior strength. The prosecution presented an eyewitness, Bernardino Cacao, who testified that he saw the victim's car with four passengers, including Kenneth Florendo and Roderick Garcia. He witnessed Florendo drag the victim out of the car, shoot him, and then flee with his companions. The police apprehended appellant Edwin De Vera near the crime scene, acting suspiciously. De Vera initially claimed to be a victim of a hold-up but later admitted to being with the group that perpetrated the crime, implicating Roderick Garcia. Both De Vera and Garcia were persuaded to give written statements after conferring with Atty. Confesor Sansano of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). A paraffin test on De Vera yielded positive results for gunpowder nitrates, while Garcia's was negative. Kenneth Florendo and Elmer Castro remained at large. Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 57) found appellant Edwin De Vera and Roderick Garcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. Only Edwin De Vera appealed the decision. The Petition: Appellant De Vera argued that the prosecution eyewitness did not testify to any criminal act of his, that the trial court erred in finding conspiracy and his participation as a co-conspirator, that his extrajudicial statement was inadmissible due to coercion and violation of constitutional rights, and that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue(s)
Whether the prosecution eyewitness's testimony sufficiently established the criminal participation of appellant Edwin De Vera, and whether conspiracy to kill the victim was proven beyond reasonable doubt. Whether appellant's extrajudicial statement was admissible in evidence. Whether appellant should be convicted as a principal or an accomplice. What are the qualifying circumstances and applicable damages.
Ruling
The Supreme Court partially granted the appeal. It convicted appellant Edwin De Vera as an accomplice, not a principal, in the crime of murder. He was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. The Court affirmed the awards of P50,000 indemnity ex delicto, P211,670 as compensatory damages, and legal interest on these amounts. The award of moral damages was reduced to P50,000, and the award for loss of earning capacity was deleted.
Ratio Decidendi
On the sufficiency of the prosecution eyewitness testimony and the existence of conspiracy: The Court found that the eyewitness testimony of Bernardino Cacao did not sufficiently establish appellant De Vera's culpability as a conspirator. While Cacao saw De Vera in the car and witnessed the subsequent shooting by Florendo, there was nothing in his testimony that directly implicated De Vera in any overt act towards the commission of the crime beyond mere presence. The Court reiterated that mere presence at the locus criminis does not automatically amount to conspiracy and that conspiracy must be founded on facts, not surmises or conjectures. The trial court's finding of conspiracy was based on presumptions, which were deemed insufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. On the admissibility of appellant's extrajudicial statement: The Court rejected appellant's claim that his extrajudicial statement was inadmissible due to torture and lack of counsel. Atty. Confesor Sansano testified that he was present throughout the interrogation, ensured the suspects understood their rights, and checked for signs of torture. The Court found Atty. Sansano's testimony credible and sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirement of assistance of counsel during custodial investigation. Appellant's allegations of torture were unsubstantiated and insufficient to overcome the presumption of voluntariness of the confession, especially when corroborated by other evidence. On appellant's liability as an accomplice versus a principal: The Court distinguished between a conspirator and an accomplice. It held that while De Vera knew of Florendo's intention to kill and cooperated by acting as a lookout, his participation occurred after the decision to kill had been made and he did not participate in the planning. His statement indicated he was present due to social pressure ('nagkahiyaan na') and that the plan could have been accomplished without him. Furthermore, he was unarmed while his co-accused were armed. These factors led the Court to conclude that he was an accomplice, whose liability is one degree lower than that of a principal, rather than a co-conspirator whose liability is collective. On the qualifying circumstances and damages: The Court agreed that the killing constituted murder, but noted that treachery absorbs the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Evident premeditation was also considered. However, since the crime was committed before the effectivity of the Death Penalty Law, the death penalty could not be imposed. The Court affirmed the death indemnity and compensatory damages but reduced the moral damages and deleted the award for loss of earning capacity due to lack of factual basis, emphasizing that such damages must be duly proven and cannot be presumed.
Main Doctrine
The Court distinguished between a conspirator and an accomplice, holding that while mere presence at the crime scene does not amount to conspiracy, an individual who knows of the criminal design and cooperates knowingly or intentionally, performing acts not indispensable to the commission of the crime, is considered an accomplice. The Court also affirmed that extrajudicial confessions obtained with the assistance of counsel, even if provided by the State, are admissible if the constitutional rights of the accused are respected and the confession is voluntary.