Deloso v. Desierto
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners Amor D. Deloso, Ireneo B. Onia, and Nelson A. Quejada, then Governor, Provincial Treasurer, and Provincial Chief Accountant of Zambales, respectively, were investigated following a Commission on Audit (COA) report. The COA audit for 1988-1989 revealed two primary issues: (1) unnecessary payment of P194,647.00 for unutilized road graders and water trucks included as pay items in nine provincial projects, and (2) double payment of P4,700.00 for burial expenses to Funeraria Iba. These findings led to a complaint filed by Congresswoman Pacita T. Gonzales with the Office of the Ombudsman. Procedural History: Following the complaint and the petitioners' counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor, filed four informations with the Sandiganbayan on November 7, 1995, charging petitioners with malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents and violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Two of these cases, Criminal Cases Nos. 23292 and 23295, are the subject of this petition. Petitioners sought to defer arraignment and requested a reinvestigation, which was initially deferred by the Sandiganbayan. Subsequent motions for reinvestigation and reconsideration before the Ombudsman saw recommendations for withdrawal of the charges against petitioners denied, although charges against co-accused were dismissed on grounds of good faith. The Ombudsman's final denial of the petitioners' third motion for reconsideration prompted the filing of this petition. The Petition: This is a petition for certiorari and injunction seeking to halt the prosecution of petitioners in Criminal Cases Nos. 23292 and 23295 before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners argue that the Ombudsman acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, by denying their motions to withdraw the informations or dismiss the cases. They contend that the alleged double payment was an honest mistake due to disorganized records and that the equipment expenses were necessary, relying in good faith on subordinate reports. They further assert that the dismissal of charges against co-accused on grounds of good faith should extend to them, and that the Ombudsman's denial without sufficient explanation constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners invoke exceptions to the rule against enjoining criminal prosecutions, citing Brocka v. Enrile.
Issue(s)
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioners' motions to withdraw the informations or dismiss the cases. Whether the defenses of good faith and lack of criminal intent are sufficient grounds to dismiss the charges at the preliminary investigation stage. Whether the dismissal of charges against co-accused on the ground of good faith warrants the dismissal of charges against the petitioners.
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the petition and ordered the Sandiganbayan to proceed with the arraignment and trial of the cases with all deliberate dispatch.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of grave abuse of discretion: The Court held that the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the dismissal of the cases against the petitioners. The Court reiterated that a petition for certiorari to restrain criminal prosecution is an exception to the general rule, but the petitioners failed to establish such an exception. The Ombudsman's disapproval of the investigating prosecutor's recommendation was based on the belief that there was sufficient evidence to indict the petitioners, and this difference in opinion does not amount to grave abuse of discretion. The Court emphasized that the Ombudsman's role is to determine if there is probable cause, not to ascertain guilt beyond reasonable doubt. On the defenses of good faith and lack of criminal intent: The Court agreed with the public respondents that defenses of good faith and lack of criminal intent are evidentiary in nature and are best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. These defenses cannot be definitively resolved during the preliminary investigation stage. The Court noted that for malversation, criminal intent or criminal negligence must be present, and negligence, even if not intentional deceit, is punishable. The issue of whether the equipment expenses were necessary or if the petitioners acted in good faith by relying on subordinate reports is a factual matter for the trial court to determine. On the dismissal of charges against co-accused: The Court disagreed with the petitioners' assertion that the dismissal of charges against their co-accused on the ground of good faith automatically warrants the dismissal of charges against them. The Court explained that the defense of good faith is personal, and each accused must prove its existence in their own case. Therefore, a finding of good faith in favor of co-accused does not necessarily translate to a similar finding for the petitioners, especially since the Ombudsman believed there was probable cause against the latter based on the evidence presented.
Main Doctrine
The determination of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction; it is enough that prosecutors believe that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Defenses of good faith and lack of criminal intent are evidentiary in nature and are best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.