Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto

G.R. No. 130140 · 1999-10-25 · J. DAVIDE, JR., J.: · Primary: Criminal; Secondary: Administrative, Remedial
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (COMMITTEE) filed a petition for certiorari against the Ombudsman, who dismissed a complaint (OMB-0-96-0968) charging Directors of Philippine Seeds, Inc. (PSI) and Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) officials with violations of paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019. The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription, ruling that the prescriptive period commenced from the dates the alleged behest loans were granted (1969, 1975, 1978). Procedural History: The COMMITTEE filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Subsequently, the COMMITTEE filed the instant petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, arguing that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the offenses had prescribed. The Petition: The COMMITTEE contended that the right of the State to recover ill-gotten wealth is imprescriptible under Section 15, Article XI of the Constitution. Even if criminal charges were prescriptible, they argued that the prescriptive period should be counted from the discovery of the crimes, not their commission, and that the Dinsay ruling was not applicable. They also invoked the principle of "equitable tolling" due to the concealed nature of the loans and the circumstances under which they were granted.

Issue(s)

Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the offenses charged had prescribed, considering the applicability of the discovery rule in behest loan cases and the relevance of cases like Dinsay, Sandiganbayan, and Duque. Whether the prescriptive period for violations of R.A. No. 3019 should be counted from the date of commission or the date of discovery of the offense, particularly in cases involving alleged connivance to conceal violations. Whether Section 15 of Article XI of the Constitution, regarding the imprescriptibility of the State's right to recover unlawfully acquired properties, applies to criminal actions.

Ruling

The Supreme Court granted the petition, setting aside the Ombudsman's resolution and order. The Ombudsman was directed to proceed with the preliminary investigation of Case No. OMB-0-96-0968, taking into account the Court's disquisitions on the computation of the prescriptive period.

Ratio Decidendi

On the Ombudsman's dismissal and the applicability of the discovery rule: The Court held that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint outright based solely on the dates of the alleged loans without requiring evidence on the date of discovery of the offense. The Court agreed with the COMMITTEE that in cases involving behest loans, where public officials allegedly connived to conceal violations of R.A. No. 3019, the prescriptive period should be computed from the discovery of the offense. The Court found the Ombudsman's reliance on People v. Dinsay and People v. Sandiganbayan misplaced, distinguishing them from People v. Duque, which applied the discovery rule to illegal recruitment. It was deemed "well-nigh impossible" for the State to have known the violations at the time the transactions were made due to the alleged conspiracy. On the computation of the prescriptive period for offenses under special laws: The Court reiterated that for offenses penalized by special laws, such as violations of R.A. No. 3019, the prescriptive period is governed by Section 2 of Act No. 3326. This section provides that prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof. The Court emphasized that the phrase "if the same be not known" refers to actual lack of knowledge or situations where the crime is not reasonably knowable due to the circumstances. On the applicability of Section 15, Article XI of the Constitution: The Court clarified that Section 15 of Article XI of the Constitution, which states that the right of the State to recover unlawfully acquired properties shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel, applies only to civil actions for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, not to criminal cases. The records of the Constitutional Commission showed that an amendment to include criminal actions was proposed but later deleted.

Main Doctrine

The prescriptive period for offenses under special laws, such as violations of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), commences from the discovery of the commission of the offense, not necessarily from the date of commission, especially when the offense is not immediately known due to concealment or conspiracy.

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