Loreto v. Brion
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Jose P. Loreto, III, a minor represented by his father, Jose V. Loreto, ran for President of the Pambayang Federasyon Ng Mga Sangguniang Kabataan of Baybay, Leyte Chapter in the July 5, 1996 elections. He garnered the second highest number of votes, with Paul Ian Veloso receiving the most votes and Ruphil Bañoc receiving fewer votes than Loreto. A pre-election protest was filed against Veloso for alleged violations of campaign regulations. 2. Procedural History: On August 6, 1996, the Board of Election Supervisors disqualified Paul Ian Veloso and resolved that the elected Vice President should assume the presidency. This resolution became final. Petitioner Loreto took his oath and performed the duties of President but could not collect salaries due to a lack of proclamation papers. He then filed a petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court to compel the Board of Election Supervisors to proclaim him as President. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition, ruling that as a second-place finisher, Loreto was not entitled to the presidency even with the disqualification of the winning candidate. 3. The Petition: Petitioner Jose V. Loreto, III, through his father, filed this petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, raising a pure question of law. He argues that the votes cast for the disqualified candidate, Paul Ian Veloso, should be considered stray or invalid, and that Veloso's disqualification retroacted to the time the case was filed, effectively making Loreto the winner. The petition seeks to overturn the trial court's decision and compel his proclamation as President.
Issue(s)
Whether or not the trial court was correct in declaring that petitioner was not qualified to assume the presidency of the Sangguniang Kabataan Chapter of Baybay, Leyte in lieu of a disqualified candidate since the petitioner is a mere second placer to the deposed winner. Whether or not votes cast for a disqualified candidate should be treated as stray, void, or meaningless, and whether the subsequent finding of disqualification should retroact to the date of the elections to invalidate votes cast for the disqualified candidate. Whether or not the petition for mandamus should be granted to compel the Board of Election Supervisors to proclaim the petitioner.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The Regional Trial Court did not err in relying on established jurisprudence that a second placer does not automatically become the winner upon the disqualification of the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether a second placer is entitled to the position upon disqualification of the winning candidate: The Court reiterated the firmly settled doctrine that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving the highest number of votes does not automatically entitle the eligible candidate receiving the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner. The rationale is to avoid disenfranchising the electorate and undermining the democratic process by allowing a repudiated candidate to take office. To rule otherwise would be to impose an unclear expression of the voters' will, as the second placer might have received a numerically insignificant number of votes, tantamount to rejection. The Court cited Geronimo vs. Ramos, Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC, Abella vs. COMELEC, and Benito vs. COMELEC to support this principle. On the issue of whether votes cast for a disqualified candidate should be treated as stray or void and whether disqualification retroacts to the election date: The Court rejected the petitioner's contention that votes cast for Paul Ian Veloso should be treated as stray, void, or meaningless, and that the disqualification should retroact to the date of the elections. The Court pointed out that the votes cast for a disqualified candidate are presumed to have been cast in the belief that the candidate was qualified. The subsequent finding of disqualification does not retroact to invalidate these votes. This principle was squarely rejected in Reyes vs. COMELEC, which held that the votes cast for the disqualified candidate are presumed valid unless the law clearly states otherwise. On the procedural issue of mandamus: The petition for mandamus sought to compel the Board of Election Supervisors to proclaim the petitioner. However, based on the substantive ruling that the petitioner, as a second placer, was not entitled to the position, the petition for mandamus was correctly dismissed by the court a quo. The remedy of mandamus is available only to compel the performance of a ministerial duty, and in this case, the proclamation of the petitioner was not a ministerial duty given the established legal principles regarding disqualified candidates and second placers.
Main Doctrine
The ineligibility of a candidate receiving the highest number of votes does not automatically entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner. Votes cast for a disqualified candidate are presumed to have been cast in the belief that the candidate was qualified, and do not retroact to become stray or void.