Bermudez v. Torres
NEW DOCTRINEFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the appointment of Conrado Quiaoit as the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac. Petitioner Oscar Bermudez, the First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and Officer-In-Charge, was a recommendee of the Justice Secretary. Respondent Quiaoit, supported by a local representative, was appointed by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 30, 1997. Quiaoit took his oath and assumed office on July 21, 1997, but Bermudez refused to vacate, citing the non-release of the original appointment document from the Justice Secretary. Quiaoit, however, proceeded to perform the duties of the office. 2. Procedural History: Following a meeting with the Justice Secretary on September 17, 1997, Bermudez was instructed to wind up his cases and turn over the office to Quiaoit by October 16, 1997. The original appointment of Quiaoit was transmitted through various channels, reaching Quiaoit on October 2, 1997, who then officially assumed office on October 16, 1997, with Bermudez being detailed to another office. Prior to Quiaoit's official assumption on October 16, 1997, Bermudez, along with co-petitioners Arturo Llobrera and Claudio Dayaon, filed a petition for prohibition, injunction, and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac on October 10, 1997. The trial court dismissed their petition on October 20, 1997, and subsequently denied their motion for reconsideration. 3. The Petition: Petitioners seek a reversal of the trial court's dismissal order through a petition for review on certiorari, raising a pure question of law. They argue that Quiaoit's appointment is invalid due to the absence of the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice, as purportedly required by Section 9 of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code. Petitioners analogize this to the ruling in San Juan vs. CSC, which emphasized the mandatory nature of recommendations in certain appointments. Respondents, however, contend that the phrase "upon recommendation of the Secretary" in the relevant statute is merely advisory and not binding on the President, who possesses discretionary power in appointments within the Executive Department.
Issue(s)
Whether the absence of a recommendation from the Secretary of Justice is fatal to the appointment of a Provincial Prosecutor. Whether the phrase "upon recommendation of the Secretary" in Section 9, Chapter II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code is mandatory or directory.
Ruling
The petition is DENIED. The appointment of respondent Conrado Quiaoit as Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac is valid.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the absence of a recommendation from the Secretary of Justice is fatal to the appointment of a Provincial Prosecutor: The Court held that the phrase "upon recommendation of the Secretary" in Section 9, Chapter II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code should be interpreted as merely advisory, exhortatory, or an indorsement. It is persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon the President. The recommendation is advisory in nature, and the President, as the head of the Executive Department, can disregard or do away with the action of departments, bureaus, or offices, even in the exercise of discretionary authority, without acting beyond the scope of his authority. The Court emphasized that the power to appoint is intrinsically an executive act involving discretion, and the President has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment. The President's authority includes the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus, and offices, which means he can alter, modify, or set aside what a subordinate officer has done and substitute his own judgment. Therefore, the President can interfere in the exercise of discretion of officials under him or altogether ignore their recommendations. On the issue of whether the phrase "upon recommendation of the Secretary" is mandatory or directory: The Court ruled that the phrase is directory. The Court distinguished the present case from San Juan vs. CSC, where the recommendation of the Governor was considered mandatory due to the constitutional mandate on local autonomy. In San Juan, the Court stressed that where a law is capable of two interpretations, one favoring centralized power and the other favoring local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy. The Court noted that the President exercises general supervision over local government units, necessitating a sharing of power with local officials in certain appointments, such as that of a Provincial Budget Officer. However, in the instant case, the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice and the appointment by the President are both acts of the Executive Department itself, with no sharing of power involved. The President's power of appointment is an exercise of discretion, and the Secretary's recommendation is merely advisory, not a condition precedent that would invalidate the appointment if not followed.
Main Doctrine
The phrase "upon recommendation of the Secretary," in Section 9, Chapter II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code, is advisory and not binding upon the President, who exercises discretion in appointments.