Lao v. Macapugay
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Petitioner Peter Chua Lao owns the RC Building, adjacent to the property of private respondents Spouses Venancio and Paulina Tay. The Tays obtained a building permit for a four-storey commercial building. During construction, they discovered that the fifth and sixth floors of Lao's building encroached on their property by 0.40 centimeters. The Tays filed a complaint with the Quezon City Office of the Building Official (OBO) for illegal encroachment. 2. Procedural History: In response to the Tays' complaint, Lao filed a counter-complaint seeking the revocation of the Tays' building permit. The OBO issued a resolution ordering Lao to rectify the encroachment, which was later denied reconsideration by the OBO officials. Lao appealed this decision to the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). While the appeal was pending, Lao filed criminal charges against the OBO officials and the Tays before the Ombudsman for violations of Republic Act No. 3019 and the Revised Penal Code. The DPWH eventually ruled in Lao's favor, declaring the OBO's decision void for lack of jurisdiction and advising a motu proprio investigation into both buildings for violations of building codes. Subsequently, the Ombudsman dismissed Lao's criminal charges for lack of probable cause, finding no bad faith on the part of the public officials. The Ombudsman also denied Lao's motion for reconsideration. 3. The Petition: This petition for certiorari assails the Ombudsman's resolution dismissing the criminal charges against the respondent public officials and the Tays, and the subsequent order denying reconsideration. Lao argues that the questioned acts of the public officials were motivated by bad faith. The respondents, in their comment, brought to the Court's attention a Compromise Agreement executed by Lao and the Tays, settling their civil dispute. However, the Court notes that a compromise agreement cannot affect criminal charges. The Court ultimately dismisses the petition, agreeing with the Ombudsman that there was no probable cause, as the OBO officials' approval of the building permit, despite alleged errors, constituted an error of judgment rather than a violation of anti-graft laws or the Revised Penal Code.
Issue(s)
Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal charges for violation of RA 3019 and the Revised Penal Code against the public officials and private respondents. Whether the acts of the respondent building officials in approving the building permit and issuing resolutions constituted violations of RA 3019 and the Revised Penal Code, and the effect of the compromise agreement on potential criminal liability.
Ruling
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It affirmed the Ombudsman's resolution finding no probable cause to file criminal charges, as the acts complained of constituted an error of judgment, not necessarily a violation of law, in the absence of bad faith. The Court also noted that a compromise agreement had been reached between petitioner and private respondents to settle their civil dispute, although it could not affect the criminal charges.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the Ombudsman's dismissal of criminal charges and the alleged violations of RA 3019 and the Revised Penal Code: The Court held that the Ombudsman correctly dismissed the charges for lack of probable cause. The resolution of the City Engineer ordering petitioner to rectify the encroachment, and the subsequent denial of the motion for reconsideration, were considered by the Ombudsman as acts that did not necessarily demonstrate bad faith or intent to violate the law. The Court agreed that these actions could be characterized as an error of judgment rather than a corrupt act or a violation of the anti-graft law or the Revised Penal Code. The fact that the DPWH later declared the OBO's decision void for lack of jurisdiction did not automatically translate to criminal liability for the public officials involved, as the primary consideration for filing criminal charges is the existence of probable cause, which requires more than just an error in judgment. The Court emphasized that the acts complained of did not show that the respondent building officials were motivated by bad faith, which is a crucial element in proving violations of RA 3019, particularly Section 3 (e) and (j). On the issue of the acts of the respondent building officials in approving the building permit and issuing resolutions constituting violations of RA 3019 and the Revised Penal Code, and the effect of the compromise agreement: The Court acknowledged the compromise agreement entered into by petitioner and private respondents to settle their civil dispute. However, it clarified that while compromises are generally favored to avoid or end litigation in civil cases, they cannot affect criminal liability. The law does not permit the settlement of criminal liability through compromise agreements. Therefore, the compromise agreement, although valid for the civil aspect of the dispute between petitioner and the Tays, did not preclude the investigation and prosecution of any criminal offenses that may have been committed.
Main Doctrine
The approval of a building permit by building officials, despite alleged patent errors in the plans, may constitute an error of judgment, not necessarily a violation of the anti-graft law or the Revised Penal Code, especially when there is no showing of bad faith. A compromise agreement, while valid for civil disputes, cannot settle criminal liability.