Bagatsing v. Commission on Elections
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners Amado S. Bagatsing, Ernesto M. Maceda, and Jaime Lopez, along with private respondent Jose L. Atienza, were candidates for Mayor of Manila in the May 11, 1998 elections. Seven days after the elections, on May 18, 1998, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) seeking the disqualification of private respondent Atienza. The basis for this complaint was the alleged disbursement of public funds amounting to approximately P3,375,000.00 within the 45-day period preceding the elections, in violation of Section 261 (g) (2) of the Omnibus Election Code. This disbursement was reportedly intended as financial assistance to public school teachers who served as poll workers. Procedural History: On May 20, 1998, the COMELEC First Division issued an order finding probable cause for election offenses and directing the City Board of Canvassers to complete the canvassing but to suspend the proclamation of Jose L. Atienza if he obtained the winning votes, pending resolution of the disqualification case. Private respondent Atienza filed a motion for reconsideration, which the COMELEC First Division granted on June 4, 1998, setting aside the suspension order and directing the proclamation of the winning candidate. The COMELEC First Division dismissed the disqualification case as such but referred the charges to its Law Department for preliminary investigation, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 2050. On the same day, petitioners filed motions to suspend proclamation and for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc. Despite these, private respondent Atienza was proclaimed Mayor of Manila later that afternoon. On June 25, 1999, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, even though their motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc was still pending (and later denied for having filed the petition with the Supreme Court). The Petition: The petitioners seek to annul the June 4, 1998 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, alleging grave abuse of discretion. Their primary argument is that the COMELEC erred in dismissing the disqualification case based on COMELEC Resolution No. 2050, contending that this resolution had been modified by the Supreme Court in the case of Sunga v. COMELEC. They specifically argue that the COMELEC should have continued the trial of the disqualification case, as mandated by Section 6 of R.A. 6646, rather than dismissing it as a disqualification case. Furthermore, petitioners fault the COMELEC for not ordering the suspension of respondent's proclamation, despite their motions. The Supreme Court, however, found that the disqualification case was filed after the election, thus paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 2050, which allows dismissal as a disqualification case but referral for preliminary investigation, was correctly applied. The Court also noted that suspension of proclamation was not warranted as there was no prima facie finding of guilt by the Law Department.
Issue(s)
Whether the COMELEC First Division committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the disqualification case against private respondent and referring it to its Law Department for preliminary investigation. Whether the COMELEC erred in not ordering the suspension of respondent's proclamation as mayor.
Ruling
The petition is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated June 4, 1998, of the Commission on Elections First Division is AFFIRMED.
Ratio Decidendi
On the dismissal of the disqualification case and referral for preliminary investigation: The Court held that COMELEC Resolution No. 2050, specifically paragraph 2, correctly applied to the instant case. This paragraph mandates that a complaint for disqualification filed after the election but before proclamation shall be dismissed as a disqualification case but referred to the Law Department for preliminary investigation. The Court clarified that the Supreme Court's ruling in Sunga v. COMELEC did not nullify COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 in its entirety, but rather found objectionable the second paragraph of paragraph 1 concerning cases filed before an election that remain unresolved. In this case, the disqualification complaint was filed after the election, thus paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 2050 was the applicable rule. The COMELEC's action of dismissing the disqualification case and referring the matter for preliminary investigation was in accordance with this rule and thus not an act of grave abuse of discretion. The Court emphasized that the COMELEC's procedural rules for cases filed before and after an election differ, and the COMELEC correctly applied the post-election rule here. On the suspension of proclamation: The Court ruled that the COMELEC did not err in not ordering the suspension of respondent's proclamation. According to the second paragraph of paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 2050, suspension of proclamation is only possible if, before proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt and an information is filed with the appropriate trial court, which then orders the suspension due to strong evidence of guilt. Since none of these circumstances were present, suspension was not warranted. The mere pendency of a disqualification case against a winning candidate does not justify suspending their proclamation, as this could encourage baseless petitions and subvert the electorate's will. The Court cautioned against forum-shopping and the practice of filing petitions with higher courts without awaiting resolution of pending motions before lower tribunals.
Main Doctrine
The filing of a disqualification case after an election but before proclamation, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, necessitates dismissal as a disqualification case but referral to the Law Department for preliminary investigation. Suspension of proclamation is only warranted if the Law Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt and an information is filed, and the court orders suspension due to strong evidence of guilt.