Factoran, Jr. v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: On August 9, 1988, a six-wheeler truck carrying approximately 4,000 board feet of narra lumber was intercepted along Marcos Highway. The driver, Jesus Sy, was apprehended, and the truck and its cargo were brought to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). An investigation revealed discrepancies in the documentation accompanying the lumber, including a mismatch in declared items (flitches versus lumber), incorrect truck plate numbers, absence of a Certificate of Lumber Origin, and an incorrect buyer in the sales agreement. These discrepancies constituted violations of Bureau of Forestry Development (BFD) Circular No. 10 and Section 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, the Revised Forestry Code, which prohibits the possession or transportation of timber and other forest products without proper documentation. 2. Procedural History: Following the apprehension, petitioner Atty. Vicente Robles issued a temporary seizure order and receipt for the lumber and truck. Subsequently, on January 20, 1989, petitioner Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, issued an order confiscating the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck, forfeiting them in favor of the government. The private respondents did not appeal this order to the Office of the President. On March 17, 1989, private respondents filed a complaint for replevin and injunction with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 80, seeking the return of the confiscated items and to halt an impending public auction. The RTC issued an order to desist from the auction and set a hearing for a preliminary injunction. The same day, private respondents filed an ex-parte motion for release and return of goods, and the trial court granted a writ of replevin, ordering the petitioners to deliver the lumber, documents, and truck to the private respondents. Despite the issuance of a writ of seizure on March 22, 1989, petitioners refused to comply. The Sheriff reported being prevented from taking possession. Petitioners attempted to post a counterbond to stay execution, but their attempts were initially denied due to procedural defects. They later filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and/or Mandamus with the Court of Appeals to annul the RTC orders. The Court of Appeals initially issued a temporary restraining order, later converted to a preliminary injunction, but ultimately dismissed the petition and lifted the injunction on March 30, 1990, ruling that the writ of replevin was mandatory. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied on May 18, 1990. 3. The Petition: The petitioners are seeking a review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals' decision and resolution. They contend that confiscated lumber cannot be the subject of replevin, that they are not compelled to criminally prosecute the private respondents but may opt for confiscation, that private respondents were charged criminally, and that the writ of replevin was issued in contravention of P.D. 605. The core of their argument is that the properties were lawfully confiscated under Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, placing them in custodia legis and thus beyond the reach of a replevin action. They assert that the administrative confiscation under Section 68-A is distinct from criminal proceedings and that the private respondents were afforded due process. The petition argues that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the issuance of a writ of replevin was mandatory and in failing to recognize that the properties were lawfully seized and held by the DENR.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the delivery of the confiscated narra lumber and six-wheeler truck to private respondents. Whether confiscated lumber can be the subject of a writ of replevin and whether property in custodia legis can be recovered through replevin. Whether the administrative confiscation under Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705 is distinct from criminal confiscation under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705. Whether Section 80 of P.D. No. 705 applies to administrative confiscation under Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705. Whether private respondents were denied due process.
Ruling
The petition is granted. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are set aside and reversed. Respondent Judge Benigno T. Dayaw is permanently enjoined from enforcing the Orders dated March 20, 1989, and March 22, 1989, in Civil Case No. Q-89-2045. If the orders have been enforced, the respondent Judge is directed to render judgment of forfeiture on the replevin bond. The respondent Judge is also permanently enjoined from further acting on the Motion for Contempt.
Ratio Decidendi
On the grave abuse of discretion and the issuance of the writ of replevin: The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the issuance of a writ of replevin was mandatory upon the filing of an affidavit and bond. The Court emphasized that the applicant must satisfy the requirements of Section 2, Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court, particularly by showing that the property was wrongfully detained. In this case, the narra lumber and truck were confiscated by the DENR Secretary under Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, which grants administrative authority to confiscate illegally possessed forest products and conveyances. Therefore, the taking of the properties was not wrongful, negating the basis for a writ of replevin. On whether confiscated lumber can be the subject of replevin and property in custodia legis: The Court ruled that property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is deemed in custodia legis and thus beyond the reach of replevin. The confiscation order issued by the DENR Secretary under Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705 placed the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck in custodia legis. Consequently, replevin would not lie to recover them, as it would interfere with the possession before the legal process was completed. This principle is now explicitly stated in Section 2(c), Rule 60 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On the distinction between administrative and criminal confiscation: The Supreme Court clarified that the administrative authority to confiscate forest products under Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, is distinct from and independent of the confiscation of forest products in a criminal action provided for in Section 68 of the same decree. Section 68-A was enacted to address inadequacies and supplement criminal enforcement, allowing the DENR to confiscate conveyances and forest products. If confiscation could only be done through a court in a criminal action, Section 68-A would be rendered purposeless. On the applicability of Section 80 of P.D. No. 705: The Court explained that Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, which requires the delivery of seized forest products within six hours to the appropriate official for preliminary investigation, applies only to criminal prosecutions under Section 68, not to administrative confiscation under Section 68-A. The title of Section 80, "Arrest; Institution of Criminal Actions," clearly indicates its intendment. Interpreting Section 68-A in relation to Section 80 would negate the purpose of the administrative remedy. On the denial of due process: The Court found no violation of due process. Private respondent Sy was investigated, and private respondents were given an opportunity to explain their side and even requested the immediate resolution and release of the impounded lumber. While a formal trial-type hearing is not always essential in administrative proceedings, due process is satisfied when parties are given a fair opportunity to be heard or to move for reconsideration. The allegation of an antedated order was unsubstantiated, and the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties was upheld.
Main Doctrine
A writ of replevin cannot be issued for property already in custodia legis, particularly when confiscated by administrative authorities under a specific law, as such property is beyond the reach of replevin. The administrative remedy of confiscation under Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705 is distinct from criminal proceedings and must be respected, with recourse to judicial review available only through a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition after exhaustion of administrative remedies.