Abrenica v. Gonda
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Plaintiff Galo Abrenica filed a complaint to compel defendants Manuel Gonda and Marcelino de Gracia to return two parcels of land. Abrenica alleged that he sold the lands to Gonda on February 21, 1916, under a right of repurchase for seven years, for P75. Upon expiration of the period, Gonda refused to deliver the property despite tender of payment. Procedural History: The justice of the peace, trying the case by assignment from the Court of First Instance, ruled in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the return of the lands upon payment of P75 to Gonda. The defendants' motion for a new trial was denied. They appealed to the Supreme Court. The Petition: The appellants alleged that the trial judge erred in holding that he had jurisdiction to try the case, and in trying it despite the alleged unconstitutionality of Act No. 2041, which authorized justices of the peace to try cases by assignment. They also alleged that the court founded its judgment on inadmissible and illegal evidence.
Issue(s)
Whether the justice of the peace had jurisdiction to try the case under Act No. 2041. Whether the trial court erred in admitting and basing its judgment on parol evidence concerning a contract that should have been in writing. Whether the plaintiff proved the existence of a sale with right of repurchase.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court. It held that the justice of the peace had jurisdiction under Act No. 2041, and that the evidence, despite being parol, was admissible because the defendants waived their right to object by failing to make timely objections and by cross-examining the witnesses on the subject matter. The Court found that the plaintiff sufficiently proved the sale with right of repurchase.
Ratio Decidendi
On the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace: The Court reiterated its previous rulings in Calampiano vs. Tolentino (29 Phil. Rep., 116) that Act No. 2041 is valid and constitutional. Under this Act, a justice of the peace, when assigned to try cases, acts not as a justice of the peace but as a judge of the Court of First Instance, holding, in effect, a Court of First Instance. Therefore, the objection to jurisdiction based on the Barrameda vs. Moir case was not well-taken. On the admissibility of parol evidence: The Court emphasized the rule that objections to the admissibility of evidence must be made at the proper time, which is when the inadmissibility may be inferred from the question or answer. A motion to strike out evidence made without timely protest is useless and ineffective. The defendants' counsel failed to object to the plaintiff's testimony regarding the verbal contract until after the plaintiff had finished testifying. Furthermore, the defendants' counsel engaged in cross-examination of the plaintiff and other witnesses concerning the details of the contract, which constituted a waiver of their right to have the evidence stricken out. The Court cited numerous US cases to support the principle that failure to object to parol evidence waives the benefit of the statute and that objections made after testimony has been given are too late. On the proof of the sale with right of repurchase: The Court found that the plaintiff's testimony, corroborated by witnesses Juan Carandang, Domingo Tamayo, and Pedro Mendoza, sufficiently proved the sale with right of repurchase for P75, under a seven-year period, on February 21, 1906. The defendants' claim of an absolute sale was not substantiated, as they failed to present any written instrument or proof of its loss, despite alleging its existence. The court also noted that the defendant Gonda's tax declaration of the land three months after the alleged sale was consistent with the plaintiff's claim of a sale with right of repurchase, as Gonda would have been the owner for seven years, subject to repurchase. The fact that Gonda did not declare the land earlier was seen as evidence against an outright sale 19 years prior.
Main Doctrine
A motion to strike out parol or documentary evidence from the record is useless and ineffective if made without timely protest, objection, or opposition. Failure to object to the admission of evidence constitutes a waiver of the right to have it stricken out later.