Sebastian v. Garchitorena
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: An Information for Malversation of Public Funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code was filed against Rosita C. Pada, Teresita B. Rodriquez, Rachel V. Torres, Lourdes A. Enriquez, and Salvador C. Sebastian (petitioner). The Information alleged that the accused, while in the performance of their official functions and conspiring with one another, misappropriated P649,290.05 worth of postage stamps. Procedural History: Petitioner and co-accused pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial, documents to be testified on by Auditor Lilibeth Rugayan were marked with the conformity of all accused and their counsel. After Auditor Rugayan's testimony, the prosecution formally offered its evidence, including the sworn statements of the accused (Exhibits "Q" to "U" and "U-1"), as part of Auditor Rugayan's testimony. The accused filed joint objections, arguing the statements were hearsay. The Sandiganbayan admitted the exhibits as part of Auditor Rugayan's testimony. A motion for reconsideration was denied. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, assailing the Sandiganbayan's resolutions admitting his sworn statement and those of his co-accused as evidence for the prosecution, arguing they were hearsay and that his constitutional rights were violated. He also questioned the Ombudsman's discretion in filing the Information.
Issue(s)
Whether the sworn statements of the petitioner and his co-accused are admissible in evidence as part of the testimony of the prosecution witness. Whether the petitioner was deprived of his constitutional rights under Sections 12 and 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Whether the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in filing the Information for malversation against the petitioner.
Ruling
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Ratio Decidendi
On the admissibility of sworn statements: The Court disagreed with the petitioner's contention that the sworn statements were inadmissible hearsay. It reiterated the rule that hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible, but clarified that statements are not hearsay if the purpose is merely to prove that the statement was made or its tenor, not its truth or falsity. In this case, the sworn statements were offered not to prove the truth of the facts stated therein, but only to prove that such written statements were actually made and executed by the accused, as part of the testimony of the examining auditor. The Court also noted that the accused, through their counsel, agreed to the marking of these exhibits during the pre-trial conference, and the Sandiganbayan's order reciting these agreements binds the parties. The Court emphasized that any evidence must be formally offered to be considered, and the sworn statements were indeed formally offered. On the alleged violation of constitutional rights: The Court ruled that the petitioner's rights under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution (right to counsel, right to remain silent) may only be invoked during a custodial investigation. The fact-finding investigation conducted by the Chief Postal Service Officer was deemed an administrative investigation, not a custodial one. The Court clarified that the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations, as their purpose is to determine facts for disciplinary measures, and parties may or may not be assisted by counsel. On the Ombudsman's discretion: The Court reiterated its consistent stance of refraining from interfering with the Ombudsman's constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutory powers. It is not the Court's role to review the Ombudsman's discretion in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint, as such independence is inherent in the Ombudsman's office. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsman's decision to prosecute all respondents for malversation to allow them to explain their individual accountability in court.
Main Doctrine
Sworn statements of accused, when offered not to prove the truth of the facts asserted therein but merely to prove that such statements were made and executed, are admissible as part of the testimony of an examining auditor, especially when the accused agreed to their marking during pre-trial.