Ong v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Spouses Victor and Grace Tiu Ong mortgaged their property to Premiere Development Bank to secure a loan for Kenlene Laboratories, Inc. Upon the debtor company's failure to pay, the bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. The bank, as the highest bidder, sought a writ of possession from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 159, during the redemption period. 2. Procedural History: The RTC issued the writ of possession upon the filing of a bond, despite the mortgagors' motion for reconsideration and recall. The mortgagors then filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals (CA), seeking to stop the implementation of the writ. They argued that a pending case for annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure (Civil Case No. 64604) would be rendered moot. The CA initially granted a temporary restraining order but later dismissed the petition for prohibition, citing procedural deficiencies and the established jurisprudence that the pendency of an annulment case does not bar the issuance of a writ of possession. 3. The Petition: The petitioners are now before the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari, arguing that the CA erred in dismissing their petition for prohibition. They contend that the implementation of the writ of possession should have been enjoined pending the resolution of their annulment case, asserting that appeal under Act 496 is not an adequate remedy and that the order for possession had not yet become final. They also argue that the issuance of the writ was in excess of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court is asked to determine if prohibition lies to enjoin a writ of possession and if the petitioners engaged in forum-shopping.
Issue(s)
Whether prohibition lies to enjoin the implementation of a writ of possession. Whether petitioners are guilty of forum shopping.
Ruling
The petition for review on certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for prohibition.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether prohibition lies to enjoin the implementation of a writ of possession: The Court held that prohibition does not lie to enjoin the implementation of a writ of possession. Under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, prohibition can only be availed of if there is no appeal, or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case, appeal under Section 8 of Act 3135, as amended by Act 4118, is still available to the petitioners. Furthermore, petitioners have a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, which is their separate case for annulment of the foreclosure of mortgage. The issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial function of the court, and the judge issuing the order following express provisions of law cannot be charged with having acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The implementation of such a writ by the sheriff is likewise ministerial. The ruling in Veloso v. IAC was clarified to apply regardless of whether the redemption period has lapsed, emphasizing that the pendency of an action for annulment of mortgage or foreclosure does not bar the issuance of a writ of possession. An injunction to prohibit the issuance of a writ of possession is entirely out of place. On the issue of whether petitioners are guilty of forum shopping: The Court found that petitioners are not guilty of forum shopping. The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. The issuance of the writ of possession is a ministerial function and summary in nature, not a judgment on the merits. Therefore, a separate case for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale cannot be barred by litis pendentia or res judicata. However, the Court noted that the filing of the petition for prohibition with the CA to enjoin the implementation of the writ of possession was ill-advised and premature because, as of the time of filing, private respondent bank had not yet been placed in possession of the property, and Section 8 of Act 3135 provides that mortgagors have "30 days after the purchaser was given possession" to file a petition to set aside the sale and cancel the writ of possession. The allegations as to the failure to comply with procedural requirements of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale are factual and for the trial court to determine in Civil Case No. 64604.
Main Doctrine
The issuance of a writ of possession in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is a ministerial function of the court, and the pendency of a separate case for annulment of the foreclosure sale does not serve as a valid ground to enjoin its implementation. Prohibition is not the proper remedy to enjoin the implementation of a writ of possession, especially when other adequate remedies are available.