People v. Armando Alicante y David
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Informations for the crime of rape were filed on July 17, 1995, against Armando Alicante y David for alleged repeated acts of rape against his minor daughter. Fifteen informations were raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina, Branch 273, and later transferred to Branch 272, a special court for heinous crimes. The victim underwent medico-legal examination on July 6, 1995, and on July 24, 1995, prematurely gave birth to twin boys who later died. Affidavits of desistance were executed by the victim and her mother on July 11, 1995, with a second affidavit from the victim signed on December 5, 1995, after the informations had been filed. Procedural History: The accused was arraigned on August 23, 1995, and pleaded not guilty. Following a joint trial on the merits, the RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for seven counts of rape, imposing the death penalty for each count and awarding damages. The case underwent automatic review by the Supreme Court. On May 31, 2000, the Supreme Court, En Banc, affirmed the conviction for seven counts of rape and the imposition of the death penalty, modified the civil indemnity and moral damages, and ordered the records forwarded to the Office of the President per Republic Act No. 7659. The Petition: This automatic review presents the accused-appellant's assignments of error, including the trial court's alleged error in considering the private complainant's testimony when it was not offered in evidence, convicting based on uncorroborated, inconsistent, dubious, coached testimony, and erring in applying presumptions that a young Filipina would not charge her father with rape if untrue and that a mother would not sacrifice her daughter to tell a story of defloration, thereby outweighing the constitutional presumption of innocence. Further errors cited are the rejection of affidavits of desistance as not amounting to an express pardon before filing informations, the lack of definite allegation of the date of offense preventing adequate defense, the failure to rule on offers of evidence impairing the right to a fair trial, and the unconstitutionality of the death penalty law as a barbaric, excessive, cruel, and unusual punishment for acts not involving the taking of life.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court erred in considering the testimony of the private complainant when it was never formally offered in evidence by the prosecution. Whether the trial court erred in convicting the accused on the basis of the uncorroborated testimony of the private complainant which was allegedly inconsistent and coached. Whether the trial court erred in applying the presumptions that a young Filipina will not charge a person with rape if it is not true and that a mother will not sacrifice her daughter to tell a story of defloration, and whether such presumptions outweigh the constitutional presumption of innocence. Whether the affidavit(s) of desistance executed by the victim and her mother constitute an express pardon extinguishing the criminal action under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code. Whether the lack of definite allegation of dates in the complaint and informations violated the accused's right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation and impaired his ability to prepare a defense. Whether the imposition of the death penalty under Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it mandates death for certain rapes not attended by the actual taking of life, is unconstitutional.
Ruling
The Supreme Court, En Banc, affirmed the RTC conviction of Armando Alicante y David for seven counts of rape. The imposition of the death penalty was affirmed in accordance with Republic Act No. 7659. The Court modified the civil awards, ordering indemnity of P75,000.00 and moral damages of P50,000.00 for each count of rape sustained. The Court ordered the records forwarded to the Office of the President pursuant to Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 for possible exercise of executive clemency.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1 (formal offer of testimony): The Court held that although Sections 34 and 35 of Rule 132, Revised Rules of Evidence prescribe that the court shall consider no evidence not formally offered and that testimony must be offered when the witness is called, the failure of the prosecution to state the purpose of the victim's testimony did not render it inadmissible where defense counsel failed to seasonably object. Applying People vs. Cawaling, et al., 293 SCRA 256 (1998), the Court explained that an objection raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered when counsel had the opportunity to object at trial and instead cross-examined the witness. The Court further reasoned that the purpose for which the victim testified was manifest and obvious and that the trial judge was deemed to know that purpose. Consequently, the alleged procedural lapse did not deprive the accused of a fair trial where no timely objection was lodged. The Court therefore allowed the testimonial evidence to be appreciated on the merits. The Court emphasized the role of trial counsel in preserving objections and the doctrine that failure to seasonably object amounts to waiver. On Issue 2 (uncorroborated and inconsistent testimony): The Court ruled that minor inconsistencies in the victim's recounting of multiple incidents, given her tender age and the traumatic nature of the events, go to credibility and not to admissibility. Applying People vs. Mandop, 244 SCRA 457 (1995) and People vs. Esquila, 254 SCRA 140 (1996), the Court explained that a child victim may exhibit lapses and inaccuracies when recounting repeated traumatic incidents and that such minor discrepancies do not necessarily create reasonable doubt. The Court reiterated the settled rule from People vs. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676 (1995) that a lone uncorroborated testimony of a rape victim can support a conviction if it is clear, positive, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, and found that the victim's testimony met that standard. The Court declined to disturb the trial court's finding on credibility, stressing that the trial court has superior vantage to observe witness demeanor. Hence, the alleged inconsistencies and the absence of corroborative evidence did not compel acquittal. On Issue 3 (presumptions vs. presumption of innocence): The Court acknowledged the tension between the 'presumptio hominis' that a young Filipina will not bring a false charge of rape and the constitutional presumption of innocence, and framed the proper approach by reference to People vs. Godoy. The Court explained that when two presumptions conflict, the court must examine the basis for each and determine which is entitled to prevail; presumptions indicating guilt do not destroy presumption of innocence unless the inculpatory evidence, together with all evidence, proves guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court held that the trial court did not subordinate the presumption of innocence improperly and, in fact, relied on the totality of the evidence, including the victim's credible testimony and medical and circumstantial indications, in reaching conviction. Thus, the invocation of societal observations about victims did not offset the constitutional standard where proof beyond reasonable doubt was found to exist. On Issue 4 (affidavit of desistance/pardon): The Court examined Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule 110, Sec. 5 of the Rules of Court and concluded that the affidavit of desistance executed by the mother (Pacita) did not, by itself, constitute an express pardon by the offended party capable of extinguishing the action, particularly where the affidavit evidenced only the mother's intent and the victim in court declared she did not wish to withdraw the charge. Applying People vs. Junio, 237 SCRA 826 (1994) and Alonte vs. Savellano, Jr., 287 SCRA 245 (1998), the Court reiterated that retractions and affidavits of desistance are generally unreliable and that a pardon which will bar prosecution must be expressed by the offended party prior to institution of the criminal action. The Court further observed that a second affidavit by the victim, executed on December 5, 1995, occurred after the informations had been filed and therefore did not extinguish the prosecution under Article 344. The Court also noted the victim's in-court statement that she was pursuing the case, diminishing the probative value of the affidavits of desistance. On Issue 5 (lack of definite dates): The Court applied Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court and prior decisions such as People v. Bernaldez, 294 SCRA 317 (1998), holding that the precise date and time of the commission of rape is not an essential element and that the complaint or information need only state the approximate time "at any time near the actual date." The Court found that the informations sufficiently apprised the accused of the nature and cause of the accusations and that any perceived sketchiness could and should have been addressed during investigation or trial. The Court therefore held that the lack of exact dates did not violate the accused's constitutional right to be informed nor preclude adequate preparation of defense when the accused failed to avail himself of timely remedies. On Issue 6 (constitutionality of death penalty under R.A. No. 7659): The Court reaffirmed its prior rulings, notably People v. Echegaray, 267 SCRA 682 (1997), upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty as imposed for heinous crimes under properly enacted statutes. The Court reasoned that the death penalty under R.A. No. 7659 is not unconstitutional as applied to incestuous rape of a minor by a parent because the heinousness of the crime and its severe and lasting harm to the victim and society justify the extreme penalty under the statute. The Court acknowledged minority dissenters who found R.A. No. 7659 unconstitutional but, by majority, concluded no cogent reason existed to overturn existing jurisprudence affirming the statute's constitutionality.
Main Doctrine
The uncorroborated testimony of a rape victim, if clear, positive, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, may suffice to sustain a conviction; an affidavit of desistance executed after institution of the criminal action does not extinguish the prosecution under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code; the death penalty as provided in Republic Act No. 7659 is constitutional as applied in this case.