Quirico Mari v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Complainant Norma Capintoy and petitioner Quirico Mari were co-employees at the Department of Agriculture. On December 6, 1991, petitioner borrowed complainant's 201 file and returned it three days later with several official documents missing. When instructed by her superior, complainant issued a memorandum to petitioner requesting an explanation. Instead of responding, petitioner confronted complainant, shouted invectives at her, banged a chair, and choked her. Petitioner claimed he borrowed his service record, not his 201 file, and that complainant provoked his reaction. Procedural History: On January 7, 1992, complainant filed a criminal complaint for slander by deed against petitioner. An amended complaint was later filed, alleging the crime was aggravated because the offended party was a woman. The Municipal Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, found petitioner guilty and sentenced him to an indeterminate sentence. Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court, which affirmed the trial court's decision. Subsequently, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On December 9, 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction for serious slander by deed but modified the penalty. The Petition: Petitioner seeks review of the Court of Appeals' decision, primarily arguing that the prosecution failed to prove he choked the complainant and that inconsistencies in witness testimonies suggest the choking was an afterthought. The Supreme Court notes that the issues raised are factual, which generally bar review. However, the Court finds that all lower courts erred in the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The Court also observes that the alleged aggravating circumstance of the victim being a woman was not sufficiently proven. Given the circumstances, the Court opts to impose a fine instead of imprisonment, setting aside the Court of Appeals' decision and sentencing petitioner to pay a fine of P1,000.00.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the conviction of petitioner for serious slander by deed. Whether the prosecution proved that petitioner choked the complainant. Whether the lower courts erred in the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Ruling
The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and rendered a new judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of serious slander by deed, sentencing him to pay a fine of P1,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Ratio Decidendi
On the conviction for serious slander by deed: The Court found that the issues raised by the petitioner were factual in nature, concerning the alleged choking of the complainant and inconsistencies in testimonies. As a general rule, findings of fact by the Court of Appeals, when supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court. The petitioner failed to demonstrate any exception to this rule that would warrant a review of the factual findings. Therefore, the conviction for serious slander by deed was sustained. On the alleged choking of the complainant: The Court of Appeals, as affirmed by the Supreme Court, found that the petitioner did choke the complainant. While the petitioner questioned this finding and alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies, the Supreme Court reiterated that factual issues are generally beyond its scope of review in a petition for certiorari. The lower courts, including the Court of Appeals, had already passed upon these factual matters and found the prosecution's evidence sufficient to establish the act. On the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law: The Court found that all lower courts, including the Court of Appeals, erred in the proper application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Firstly, the alleged aggravating circumstance that the offended party was a woman was not proven to be an ordinary aggravating circumstance as it was not shown that the accused deliberately intended to insult or show disrespect to her sex. The Court clarified that the mere fact of the victim being a woman does not per se constitute an aggravating circumstance. Secondly, the courts incorrectly applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law by failing to properly fix the minimum and maximum penalties within the prescribed ranges. The penalty for serious slander by deed is arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum. The penalty next lower in degree is arresto mayor minimum and medium periods. The minimum penalty should be taken from this lower range, and the maximum penalty should be from the medium period of the prescribed penalty, considering the absence of aggravating circumstances. The trial court's minimum was excessive, and the Court of Appeals' maximum was also incorrect as it exceeded the medium period. Considering the errors in the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and the fact that the offense was committed in the heat of anger and in reaction to a perceived provocation, the Court deemed it more in line with justice to impose a fine instead of imprisonment. The Revised Penal Code allows for either imprisonment or a fine for serious slander by deed. Therefore, the Court opted to impose a fine of P1,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, as permitted by law.
Main Doctrine
While the Court affirmed the conviction for serious slander by deed, it modified the penalty, emphasizing the proper application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and opting to impose a fine instead of imprisonment, considering the offense was committed in the heat of anger and in reaction to perceived provocation.