Heirs of Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaluyong City issued Resolution No. 396, S-1994, authorizing the City Mayor to institute expropriation proceedings over a property owned by Alberto Suguitan for the expansion of the Mandaluyong Medical Center. The Mayor made an offer to purchase the property, which Suguitan refused. Consequently, the City of Mandaluyong filed a complaint for expropriation. Suguitan filed a motion to dismiss, citing various grounds including the improper exercise of eminent domain, lack of public necessity, absence of just compensation, lack of appropriation, and alleged personal motives of the Mayor. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and later issued an order allowing the City to take immediate possession upon deposit of 15% of the property's fair market value, based on the tax declaration. The City took possession, and subsequently, the trial court issued an order of condemnation. Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Branch 155, denied the motion to dismiss filed by Alberto Suguitan. Subsequently, the RTC issued an order allowing the City of Mandaluyong to take immediate possession of the property upon deposit of 15% of its fair market value. Later, the RTC issued an order of condemnation, declaring the City's right to take the property upon payment of just compensation and directing the parties to submit a list of appraisers to determine such compensation. The Petition: The heirs of Alberto Suguitan filed a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the RTC's order of condemnation, arguing that the City of Mandaluyong could only exercise its delegated power of eminent domain through an ordinance, as required by Section 19 of Republic Act No. 7160, and not a mere resolution.
Issue(s)
Whether the City of Mandaluyong validly exercised its power of eminent domain through a resolution instead of an ordinance. Whether Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 7160, which allows expropriation through a resolution, prevails over Section 19 of RA 7160 itself.
Ruling
The petition is granted. The July 28, 1998 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 155, in SCA No. 875 is reversed and set aside.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the City of Mandaluyong validly exercised its power of eminent domain through a resolution instead of an ordinance: The Supreme Court ruled that the City of Mandaluyong failed to validly exercise its power of eminent domain. Section 19 of Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, explicitly requires that a local government unit may exercise the power of eminent domain "through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance." The Court emphasized that an ordinance is a law, while a resolution is merely a declaration of sentiment or opinion, and they are enacted differently. The requirement of an ordinance is a strict mandate for the exercise of this power, which is in derogation of private rights. Therefore, proceeding by mere resolution is a contravention of the law. The Court reiterated its ruling in Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation that an ordinance is necessary to authorize the filing of an expropriation complaint, as the power of eminent domain is already being exercised at that point. On the issue of whether Article 36, Rule VI of the IRR prevails over Section 19 of RA 7160: The Supreme Court held that Section 19 of RA 7160, the law itself, prevails over Article 36, Rule VI of its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). The Court stated that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule. It noted that while the IRR mentioned a resolution, the law (RA 7160) clearly requires an ordinance. The Court cited its previous ruling in Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, where it clarified that the law itself, Section 19 of RA 7160, requires an ordinance, and any provision in the IRR that contradicts this is invalid. The Court found the discrepancy to be a mere oversight in the wording of the IRR, especially since Article 32 of the same Rule VI also requires the chief executive to act pursuant to an ordinance.
Main Doctrine
The exercise of the power of eminent domain by a local government unit requires an ordinance enacted by its legislative council, not merely a resolution, to authorize the local chief executive to initiate expropriation proceedings, as mandated by Section 19 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).