Viviero v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Celestino Viviero, a licensed seaman and member of AMOSUP, was hired as Chief Officer on June 10, 1994. His contract was terminated on July 15, 1994, due to alleged poor performance, conduct, refusal to perform duties, and poor relations with the Captain. Viviero filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with AMOSUP on August 1, 1994. Grievance proceedings were conducted but failed to resolve the dispute. Consequently, Viviero filed a complaint with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) on November 28, 1994. Procedural History: The case was initially filed with the POEA, then transferred to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Adjudication Branch upon the enactment of RA 8042. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, citing the CBA's provision for voluntary arbitration. The NLRC reversed this, holding that Viviero had exhausted remedies by submitting to the grievance committee and that voluntary arbitration was not binding without mutual agreement. The NLRC remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter. The Court of Appeals, however, set aside the NLRC decision, ruling that the CBA provision for voluntary arbitration was mandatory and that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in taking cognizance of the case. The Petition: Viviero filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court, assailing the Court of Appeals' decision and arguing that the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that a Voluntary Arbitrator, not the NLRC, had jurisdiction over his illegal dismissal complaint. He contended that his complaint was a termination dispute, not an interpretation or implementation of the CBA.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that a Voluntary Arbitrator, and not the Adjudication Branch of the NLRC, has jurisdiction over the petitioner's complaint for illegal dismissal. Whether the dismissal of an employee constitutes a "grievance between the parties" as defined under the CBA, thereby falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators, and consequently divesting the NLRC of jurisdiction.
Ruling
The Supreme Court SET ASIDE the Decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter for disposition with dispatch.
Ratio Decidendi
On the jurisdiction over termination disputes: The Court held that a termination dispute falls under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter as provided by Article 217 of the Labor Code. While Article 217(c) and Article 261 of the Labor Code, along with the CBA, provide for grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration for disputes arising from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA or company personnel policies, this does not automatically divest the Labor Arbiter of jurisdiction over termination disputes. The Court clarified that for termination disputes to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators, the CBA must contain an unequivocal stipulation that such disputes are submitted to voluntary arbitration. The Court emphasized that the phrase "all disputes" in a CBA is not sufficient unless it specifically includes termination disputes. In this case, the CBA used the word "may" in referring to the referral of disputes to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitration, indicating that such submission was discretionary and not mandatory. Therefore, petitioner Viviero validly exercised his option to submit his case to a Labor Arbiter. On the interpretation of the CBA and the role of Voluntary Arbitration: The Court distinguished between "voluntary arbitration" as a mode of dispute settlement and the mandatory referral to a Voluntary Arbitrator based on a CBA provision. It noted that while the State promotes voluntary arbitration, its mandatory application hinges on the express agreement of the parties. The Court found that the use of the word "may" in the CBA provision regarding the referral of termination disputes to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitration indicated that the parties reserved the right to submit such disputes to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. The Court also noted that the private respondents' delay in filing a motion to dismiss, after filing their position paper, suggested a waiver of their right to question the procedure, although the Court ultimately based its decision on the interpretation of the CBA and the Labor Code provisions concerning jurisdiction. The Court reiterated that jurisdiction is determined by law and not by consent or estoppel, but in this instance, the law and the CBA's specific wording supported the Labor Arbiter's jurisdiction.
Main Doctrine
A termination dispute falls under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, and not a Voluntary Arbitrator, unless the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) expressly stipulates that such disputes shall be submitted to voluntary arbitration. The use of the word 'may' in the CBA provisions regarding referral to grievance machinery or voluntary arbitration indicates discretion, not a mandatory obligation, thereby preserving the option to file a complaint with the Labor Arbiter.