Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), represented by Orlando L. Salvador, sought reconsideration of a resolution dismissing its petition for certiorari, which assailed resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman dismissing a complaint for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The complaint concerned behest loans granted to the Philippine Cellophane Film Corporation (PCFC) from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). The Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, created by Administrative Order No. 13 and expanded by Memorandum Order No. 61, investigated loans with criteria such as being undercollateralized, borrower corporation being undercapitalized, presence of endorsements from high government officials, borrower being a crony, deviation from loan purpose, use of corporate layering, non-feasibility of the project, and unusual speed in loan release. The PCFC loan was found to have these characteristics, with further irregularities in its processing and grant. Procedural History: The Committee filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman, which dismissed it for lack of a prima facie case and prescription of the offense. A motion for reconsideration was denied. The PCGG filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, which was initially dismissed for being filed out of time. The PCGG sought reconsideration of this dismissal. The Petition: The PCGG argued that the right to recover behest loans is imprescriptible, that prescription does not run in favor of a trustee, and that the crime is continuing. They also contended that prescription could not be availed of if not raised as a defense. The PCGG sought to have the dismissal of the complaint by the Ombudsman reconsidered.
Issue(s)
Whether the petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period. Whether the offenses charged under R.A. No. 3019 have prescribed. Whether there was a lack of prima facie case to warrant the filing of criminal charges against the respondents.
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the motion for reconsideration, upholding the dismissal of the petition. However, it noted that the petition was considered timely filed due to the retroactive application of procedural rules. The Court affirmed the Ombudsman's discretion in determining the existence of a prima facie case and found no grave abuse of discretion in the dismissal of the complaint on the merits.
Ratio Decidendi
On the timeliness of the petition: The Court held that procedural laws are retroactive and apply to pending cases. Although the original petition was filed beyond the 60-day reglementary period, the promulgation of A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, which clarified the computation of the period when a motion for reconsideration is filed, made the petition timely. This amendment provided that the 60-day period is counted from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration, thus interrupting the original period. The Court applied this rule to the instant case, deeming the petition to have been filed within the extended period. On the prescription of offenses: The Court reiterated its ruling in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Hon. Aniano Desierto, et al. (317 SCRA 272) that for offenses under R.A. No. 3019, the prescriptive period commences from the discovery of the violation if the same was not known at the time of commission. The phrase "if the same be not known at the time" means "lack of knowledge" and not "not reasonably knowable." The Court found that the nature of behest loans, involving connivance between public officials and beneficiaries, made discovery difficult, thus justifying the computation of prescription from the date of discovery. On the existence of a prima facie case: The Court affirmed the Ombudsman's broad discretion in determining whether a criminal case should be filed. It emphasized that the Ombudsman is vested with investigatory and prosecutory powers, insulated from outside pressure, and that the Court generally refrains from interfering with this power absent grave abuse of discretion. The investigating officers' findings indicated that the respondents were charged solely as incorporators of PCFC, which the Ombudsman deemed insufficient to establish criminal liability under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Court found no palpable merit in the charges as presented, noting that the terms and conditions of the loan, including those set by DBP officers and the subsequent restructuring, indicated protection for DBP's interests and that the complainant failed to provide specific details of criminal design or collusion to cause undue injury to the government.
Main Doctrine
Procedural laws, including amendments to rules on filing petitions for certiorari, are retroactive and apply to pending cases. The period for prescription of offenses under special laws, like R.A. 3019, commences from the discovery of the violation if not known at the time of commission. The Ombudsman has discretion to determine the existence of a prima facie case, and the Court generally refrains from interfering with this power absent grave abuse of discretion.