Seagull Shipmanagement and Transport, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Benjamin T. Tuazon, a seafarer deployed by Seagull Shipmanagement and Transport, Inc., experienced coughing and shortness of breath while on board the vessel MV Pixy Maru in December 1991. He was repatriated to the Philippines after being diagnosed with a condition requiring open-heart surgery. Tuazon had a prior history of heart surgery in 1986, involving the insertion of a pacemaker. He subsequently filed a complaint for sickness and disability benefits against Seagull and its insurer, Dominion Insurance Corporation, seeking US$2,200 for 120 days of sickness benefits and US$15,000 for permanent disability benefits as stipulated in his employment contract. Procedural History: The complaint filed by Benjamin Tuazon was initially heard by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). On January 19, 1995, the POEA rendered a decision ordering Seagull Shipmanagement and Transport, Inc. and Dominion Insurance Corporation to jointly and severally pay Tuazon the claimed sickness and disability benefits. Petitioners appealed this decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On November 24, 1995, the NLRC affirmed the POEA's decision, dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. The NLRC found that Tuazon's illness was sustained during his employment and that the company physician was aware of his pacemaker. The Petition: Petitioners Seagull Shipmanagement and Transport, Inc. and Dominion Insurance Corporation filed the instant petition, which they initially captioned as a Rule 45 petition but later admitted should have been a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. They assail the NLRC's Resolution dated November 24, 1995, arguing that the NLRC erred in affirming the POEA's findings that their physician knew of Tuazon's pacemaker, that Tuazon failed to disclose his medical history, that his sickness was sustained during employment, and in awarding sickness and disability benefits. They also contend that Tuazon should be liable for repatriation expenses and attorney's fees. The Supreme Court, in the interest of justice, treated the petition as a Rule 65 certiorari action, but noted the petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC, a prerequisite for such actions, without sufficient justification.
Issue(s)
Whether the petition for review was properly treated as a special civil action for certiorari. Whether the petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not filing a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC. Whether the NLRC erred in affirming the POEA's findings that petitioner's physician knew of the pacemaker and that private respondent did not misrepresent or fail to disclose his health condition. Whether private respondent's sickness was sustained during his employment and is therefore compensable. Whether the NLRC erred in awarding sickness and permanent disability benefits. Whether private respondent should be liable for repatriation expenses and attorney's fees.
Ruling
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission dated November 24, 1995. Petitioners were ordered to pay, jointly and severally, complainant Benjamin Tuazon or his heirs the amounts awarded by the POEA and affirmed by the NLRC.
Ratio Decidendi
On the procedural issue of treating the petition as certiorari: The Court reiterated its policy of treating petitions erroneously captioned as petitions for review on certiorari as special civil actions for certiorari in the interest of justice, provided substantial compliance with the requisites of Rule 65 is met. In this case, the petitioners admitted the miscaptioning but asked for consideration, which the Court granted. On the failure to exhaust administrative remedies: The Court held that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a sine qua non to the institution of a special civil action for certiorari, subject to exceptions. Petitioners failed to explain their omission to file a motion for reconsideration before the NLRC and did not show sufficient justification for dispensing with the requirement. Certiorari cannot be used as a shield against the consequences of such an omission. On the knowledge of the pacemaker and misrepresentation: The Court found no reason to disturb the NLRC's findings. The records indicated that the respondent's physician knew of the pacemaker as early as June 1989, which was why a medical certificate was required. Furthermore, the fact that Tuazon was deployed twice by petitioners despite his pacemaker surgery in 1986, and was twice certified fit by their accredited physician, belied the allegation of misrepresentation and non-disclosure. The Court emphasized that petitioners cannot now deny the benefits deserved by the private respondent. On the compensability of the sickness: The Court noted that the claim for benefits arose from the POEA Standard Contract, which, per Circular No. 2, Series of 1984, did not require the illness to be work-connected for compensability. It was sufficient that the illness occurred during the term of the employment contract. The Court also recalled the petitioners' admission that Tuazon's work exposed him to different climates and unpredictable weather, which could trigger heart conditions. Even if the ailment was pre-existing, compensation is due if the work contributed, even minimally, to its development. The employer assumes the risk of liability, and the employee's previous physical condition is unimportant if the disease is the proximate cause of the claim. On the award of benefits: Based on the foregoing findings, the Court found no error in the NLRC's affirmation of the POEA's decision to award sickness and permanent disability benefits. The evidence sufficiently established that the illness was sustained during employment and that the employer was aware of the pre-existing condition, having cleared the employee for deployment twice. On private respondent's liability for repatriation expenses and attorney's fees: There was no provided ratio for this issue in the source text.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court affirmed the NLRC's decision ordering petitioners to pay complainant Benjamin Tuazon sickness and permanent disability benefits, holding that the employer's accredited physician's knowledge of the employee's pre-existing condition, coupled with repeated certifications of fitness to work, negates claims of misrepresentation and non-disclosure, and that under the POEA Standard Contract, compensability of illness need not depend on whether it was work-connected, but only on whether it occurred during the term of the employment contract.