People v. Jesus Gianan y Molina
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The complainant alleged that the crime charged (multiple rape) and related acts of lasciviousness were committed by accused-appellant, her father, on several occasions between December 1992 and November 1995. The complainant later fled and filed a complaint with the police; she underwent a medical examination at the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The medical report showed an old healed hymenal laceration and findings consistent with repeated sexual intercourse. Accused-appellant denied the charges and offered an alibi and explanations through his testimony. Procedural History: A case was instituted in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, which found accused-appellant guilty of multiple rape and sentenced him to triple death plus compensatory damages. The RTC decision was rendered on 1998-04-01. The case was automatically elevated for review to the Supreme Court en banc. The Petition: The accused-appellant appealed, alleging (a) that the information was void for failure to allege with certainty the dates of the alleged offenses and that it improperly charged more than one offense; (b) that the trial court erred in convicting beyond reasonable doubt; (c) that the imposition of the death penalty was erroneous; and (d) that the award of compensatory damages was improper.
Issue(s)
Whether the Regional Trial Court erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of multiple rape. Whether the information was void or defective for failing to allege with certainty the dates of the alleged offenses and thereby depriving the accused of the opportunity to prepare his defense. Whether the information unlawfully charged more than one offense and whether the accused waived any such objection by failing to move to quash prior to plea. Whether the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty ("triple death") in light of the enactment date of Republic Act No. 7659 and the allegations in the information. Whether the trial court erred in ordering the accused to pay compensatory damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00 and whether an offense properly charged as rape may be treated as acts of lasciviousness where the evidence so shows, and what the proper quantum of damages should be.
Ruling
The judgment of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED with modifications. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution proved five (5) counts of rape and one count of acts of lasciviousness. The Court ruled that the information's allegation "sometime in November 1995 and some occasions prior and/or subsequent thereto" complied with Rule 110, § 11 and was sufficient; any objection to the form of the information was waived by the accused's failure to move to quash or for a bill of particulars prior to plea. The imposition of the death penalty was modified: because Republic Act No. 7659 took effect on December 31, 1993, the death penalty could not be imposed retroactively for the rapes committed prior to that date; each of the counts of rape was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The acts of lasciviousness conviction was sentenced to an indeterminate term of reclusion temporal of 12 years and 1 day to 15 years, 6 months and 20 days. Damages were modified: moral damages of ₱50,000.00 and civil indemnity of ₱50,000.00 were imposed for each count (aggregated as set forth by the Court); costs were imposed.
Ratio Decidendi
On Whether the RTC erred in finding guilt beyond reasonable doubt: The Court found that the complainant’s testimony was candid, consistent in material particulars, and corroborated by medical evidence indicating an old healed hymenal laceration and other findings consistent with repeated sexual intercourse. The moral ascendancy of a father over his child substitutes for physical violence or intimidation in incestuous rape cases; accordingly, threats and the paternal relationship were sufficient to establish force or intimidation. The Court applied established standards regarding the credibility of rape victims and noted that discrepancies that do not go to the gravamen or are minor do not defeat a witness's credibility. The accused actively participated in trial, cross-examined witnesses and presented his own testimony, which the Court found unpersuasive against the corroborated testimony of the complainant. In sum, the cumulative testimony and medical findings satisfied the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. On Whether the information was defective for failing to allege specific dates: The Court applied Rule 110, § 11, holding that the time of commission of rape is not an essential element under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and that an information stating the offense was committed "at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed" is sufficient. Citing People v. Bugayong and other precedents, the Court emphasized that where time is not of the essence, precise dates are unnecessary so long as the offenses are shown to have occurred within the statute of limitations and before commencement of action. The Court further held that even if the information were technically defective as to dates, any such defect was cured by the evidence at trial and was waived because the accused failed to raise a timely objection or to move for a bill of particulars prior to arraignment. The Court contrasted this case with People v. Ladrillo, where specificity was essential because the accused's alibi depended on precise dates, explaining that the present accused's alibi and defense were general and not predicated on specific dates. Therefore, the Court found no reversible error arising from the information's time allegations. On Whether more than one offense was improperly charged or whether such objection was waived: The Court examined Rule 117 on motions to quash and held that an accused must move to quash before entering a plea; failure to do so constitutes waiver of grounds covered by the rule. Because accused-appellant did not move to quash nor allege the ground prior to plea, the objection that multiple offenses were charged was waived. The Court applied the Rule 117 framework and precedent to confirm that procedural safeguards exist but must be timely invoked. The accused's active participation at trial, including cross-examination and presentation of evidence, further evidenced waiver. Consequently, the trial court did not err in proceeding to trial on the information as filed. On the imposition of the death penalty and retroactivity of R.A. No. 7659: The Court ruled that Republic Act No. 7659, which prescribes the death penalty for certain rapes, took effect on December 31, 1993, and could not be applied retroactively to acts committed before that date. Therefore, the rapes committed in December 1992 and in March and April 1993 could not be punished by death and the appropriate penalty is reclusion perpetua. As for the November 1995 rape, the Court concluded that because the information did not specifically allege the qualifying circumstances required by R.A. No. 7659 (the victim's age and the offender's parental relationship), the prosecution could not benefit from the statute's qualifying sentence; consequently, that count was likewise punished by reclusion perpetua. The Court relied on its decision in People v. Teves to underscore the necessity of alleging qualifying circumstances in the information to support imposition of a death sentence. On Damages and Acts of Lasciviousness: The Court held that where proof shows a lesser included offense, conviction for that offense is permissible; thus the incident in December 1992 involving kissing was treated as acts of lasciviousness, a crime included in rape. The trial court’s award of ₱100,000.00 as compensatory damages was modified consistent with prevailing jurisprudence: moral damages of ₱50,000.00 and civil indemnity of ₱50,000.00 were awarded for each count as specified in the decision. The Court applied its prior rulings in People v. Santos, People v. Dreu and People v. Martinez to set the appropriate quantum. The imposition of costs was affirmed.
Main Doctrine
An information alleging multiple rapes need not state exact dates so long as it alleges that the offense was committed "at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed" in compliance with Rule 110, § 11; failure to make a timely motion to quash or bill of particulars waives objections as to form; Republic Act No. 7659 is not retroactive and the death penalty cannot be imposed for offenses committed prior to its effectivity; qualifying circumstances under R.A. No. 7659 such as age and relationship must be specifically alleged in the information to support imposition of a death penalty under that statute.