Dino v. Sio
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners, engaged in manufacturing and selling shirts, contracted with respondent Sio for the custom manufacture of 40,000 pieces of vinyl frogs and mooseheads, to be attached to their shirts, at P7.00 per piece. Respondent Sio delivered the items in installments, with the last delivery on September 28, 1988. Petitioners fully paid the agreed price. Subsequently, petitioners returned 29,772 pieces of these items due to non-compliance with the approved sample, demanding a refund of P208,404.00. Respondent Sio refused to pay. Procedural History: Petitioners filed an action for collection of a sum of money against respondent Sio on July 24, 1989, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners, ordering respondent Sio to pay the claimed amount and attorney's fees. Respondent Sio appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). Initially, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. However, upon respondent Sio's motion for reconsideration, the CA reversed its earlier decision and dismissed petitioners' complaint, holding that the action had prescribed. The Petition: This case is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners seeking to annul and set aside the amended decision of the Court of Appeals. Petitioners argue that the CA erred in dismissing their complaint on the ground of prescription, particularly by considering the defense of prescription for the first time on appeal via a motion for reconsideration. They contend that this defense should have been raised earlier and was deemed waived. The core issue is whether the action for refund, characterized as a breach of warranty against hidden defects, was filed within the prescriptive period and whether the defense of prescription could be raised late in the proceedings.
Issue(s)
Whether the action filed by the petitioners had prescribed. Whether the defense of prescription could be considered by the Court of Appeals despite not being raised in the answer, when it was apparent on the face of the complaint.
Ruling
The petition is DENIED, and the impugned amended decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 24, 1994, is AFFIRMED.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of prescription: The Court held that the action filed by the petitioners had prescribed. The contract between the parties was determined to be a contract for a piece of work, but the provisions on warranty against hidden defects in a contract of sale were still applicable. Article 1571 of the Civil Code provides that actions arising from warranty against hidden defects shall be barred after six months from the delivery of the thing sold. The last delivery was made on September 28, 1988, and the action was filed on July 24, 1989, which is more than nine months after the last delivery. Therefore, the action was filed beyond the six-month prescriptive period. On the issue of whether the defense of prescription could be considered: The Court reiterated the rule that the defense of prescription cannot generally be raised for the first time on appeal. However, it clarified that this is not a hard and fast rule. Citing established jurisprudence, the Court held that trial courts have the authority to dismiss an action on the ground of prescription when the facts on record clearly show it to be time-barred. This can be done even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as long as the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period are sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record, either in the plaintiff's complaint or otherwise established by the evidence. In this case, the dates of delivery and the filing of the action were undisputed and apparent from the pleadings, making the action clearly time-barred. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in considering the defense of prescription, even though it was raised for the first time on appeal via a motion for reconsideration.
Main Doctrine
The defense of prescription may be considered even if not raised in the pleadings, provided that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period are sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record, such as when the plaintiff's own complaint clearly shows that the action has prescribed.