Cochingyan v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: This case originated from a Complaint for Reconveyance Based on Constructive Trust With Preliminary Injunction filed by the petitioners against respondent China Banking Corporation, later impleading respondent Sunday Machine Works, Inc. (SMWI) as the buyer of the subject property. SMWI filed a counterclaim in the nature of an ejectment case. On December 2, 1977, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the petitioners' complaint and ordering them to surrender possession of the subject properties to SMWI, account for and turn over rentals to China Banking Corporation, and pay attorney's fees to both respondents. Procedural History: Both petitioners and SMWI appealed the trial court's December 2, 1977 decision. The trial court subsequently granted a writ of execution pending appeal, which the petitioners challenged via a special civil action for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, but this was dismissed. Despite further challenges and a petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 55080), which was dismissed for being a substitute for a late appeal, the trial court, on October 28, 1991, granted an alias writ of execution. The petitioners' subsequent petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals was again dismissed on April 14, 1993. On February 10, 1994, respondents moved for a third alias writ of execution, which the trial court granted on June 17, 1994, along with a break-open order on July 12, 1994. The petitioners filed another petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed it on July 13, 1994, for being insufficient in form and substance. The Petition: The petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals' Resolution dated July 13, 1994, which dismissed their petition for certiorari. They argue that the Regional Trial Court erred in issuing the writ of execution and break-open order because their appeal was still pending, they had stayed execution by perfecting their appeal, posting a supersedeas bond, and making periodic rental payments, and the trial court had lost jurisdiction. They also contend that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing their petition on a technicality. The core of their argument is that the trial court's decision of December 2, 1977, was not yet final and executory due to their pending appeal and compliance with procedural requirements to stay execution.
Issue(s)
Whether the RTC erred in issuing the writ of execution and break-open order while petitioners' appeal was allegedly still pending; and whether petitioners' appeal was deemed abandoned due to gross inaction and delay. Whether the filing of a supersedeas bond and monthly rental deposits had any relevance to the appeal pending in the Court of Appeals. Whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioners' petition for certiorari for insufficiency in form and substance; and on the RTC's loss of jurisdiction.
Ruling
The petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated July 13, 1994, is AFFIRMED.
Ratio Decidendi
On the alleged pending appeal and abandonment thereof: The Court held that the petitioners' appeal from the December 2, 1977 decision had been pending for an unreasonable period, constituting abandonment. The Court emphasized that while it is the duty of the clerk of court to transmit records, it is also the duty of the appellant to ensure the clerk acts, and failure to do so is not an excuse for the appellant's inaction. The petitioners' gross inaction for almost nine years, counting from the approval of their appeal in 1992 up to the present, and even longer if counting from the filing of the notice of appeal in 1978, demonstrated a lack of diligence. The Court cited jurisprudence holding that an appellant must prosecute their appeal with reasonable diligence and cannot simply wait for the clerk to act. The petitioners' efforts to have stenographic notes transcribed were made only in 1992, and no further action was shown to have been taken by them. The Court found their delay inexcusable, as there was no injunctive order from the SC enjoining the CA from proceeding with the appeal. Therefore, the appeal was deemed abandoned, rendering the December 2, 1977 decision final and executory. On the effect of supersedeas bond and rental deposits: The Court clarified that the filing of a supersedeas bond and monthly rental deposits are requirements to stay the execution of a judgment in an ejectment case, as provided by Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. However, these actions do not have any relevance to the appeal pending in the Court of Appeals. They were filed to stay the execution of the order allowing execution of the December 1977 judgment, not to ensure the progress of their appeal. Since the appeal was deemed abandoned, these actions became ineffectual in preventing the execution of the final and executory judgment. On the CA's dismissal of the petition for certiorari and the RTC's loss of jurisdiction: The Court found it unnecessary to discuss whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari for being insufficient in form and substance. Given that the trial court's decision had become final and executory due to the abandonment of the appeal, the issuance of the writ of execution and break-open order was proper, rendering the CA's dismissal of the certiorari petition moot and academic in relation to the core issue of execution. The Court reiterated that once an appeal is perfected, the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case, except for specific instances like the execution of judgments. However, this principle is predicated on a valid and actively prosecuted appeal. In this case, the prolonged inaction and delay by the petitioners led to the abandonment of their appeal. Consequently, the decision became final and executory, and the trial court regained the authority to issue a writ of execution as a matter of right upon motion of the respondents, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
Main Doctrine
A party's unreasonable delay and inaction in prosecuting their appeal, despite opportunities and available remedies, constitutes abandonment of the appeal, rendering the trial court's decision final and executory, thus entitling the winning party to a writ of execution as a matter of right.