Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Atty. Orlando Salvador, PCGG Consultant and coordinator of the Technical Working Group (TWG) of the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans, referred the loan account of Calinog-Lambunao Sugar Mills, Inc. (Calinog) with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to the TWG. Calinog had applied for and was approved a stand-by irrevocable confirmed letter of credit amounting to $22,109,412.00 in 1968, which was later increased to $22,132,377.00. Procedural History: On March 24, 1997, Atty. Salvador filed a complaint with the Ombudsman against Calinog and PNB officers for alleged violations of Sections 3(e) and (g) of R.A. 3019, citing criteria that classified the loan as a behest loan, including being undercollateralized, the borrower corporation being undercapitalized, and the non-feasibility of the project. The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint on May 29, 1997, on the ground of prescription, stating that the 15-year prescriptive period for offenses under R.A. 3019 had already passed since the loan transactions occurred in 1968, 1978, 1979, and 1982. The Petition: The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, represented by Magtangol C. Gunigundo and Orlando L. Salvador, filed a special civil action for certiorari to annul the Ombudsman's resolution and to order the filing of the necessary information for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Issue(s)
Whether the complaint filed with the Ombudsman was barred by prescription. Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription.
Ruling
The Court GRANTED the petition, SET ASIDE the Resolution of the Ombudsman, and DIRECTED the Ombudsman to conduct a preliminary investigation with deliberate dispatch. No costs.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of prescription of the offense charged: The Court reiterated that R.A. No. 3019 provides its own prescriptive period of fifteen (15) years. However, as a special law, the computation of the prescriptive period is governed by Act No. 3326, as amended. Section 2 of Act No. 3326 states that prescription begins to run from the day of the commission of the violation, or from the discovery thereof if the violation was not known at the time. The Court has consistently ruled in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February 1986 EDSA Revolution that the government, as the aggrieved party, could not have known of the violations at the time the transactions were made, and no one would have dared to question their legality. Therefore, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the date of discovery of the offense in 1992, following an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans. The filing of the complaint with the Ombudsman on March 24, 1997, which was five (5) years from the time of discovery in 1992, effectively interrupted the prescriptive period. Thus, the filing of the complaint was well within the prescriptive period. On whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion: The Ombudsman's dismissal of the complaint solely on the ground of prescription, without considering the established jurisprudence regarding the discovery rule for behest loans made prior to the EDSA Revolution, constituted grave abuse of discretion. The Ombudsman failed to apply the correct legal standard for determining the commencement of the prescriptive period in such cases. The Court's directive for the Ombudsman to conduct a preliminary investigation signifies that the dismissal was premature and that the merits of the complaint warranted further examination.
Main Doctrine
The prescriptive period for offenses under R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is fifteen (15) years. For violations not known at the time of commission, prescription begins from the date of discovery. In cases involving behest loans made prior to the February 1986 EDSA Revolution, the government as the aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time of the transactions, thus prescription commenced from the date of discovery in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans. The filing of the complaint with the Ombudsman interrupts the prescriptive period.