Heirs of Ingjug-Tiro v. Casals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The controversy involves a 5,354-square meter parcel of land originally titled in the name of Mamerto Ingjug. Mamerto Ingjug died during World War II, leaving five children: Romana, Francisco, Francisca, Luisa, and Maria. In 1965, Luisa, Maria, Eufemio Ingjug, and Guillerma Ingjug-Fuentes-Pagubo (daughter of Francisca) sold the land to respondents, claiming to be Mamerto Ingjug's only surviving heirs. The sale was evidenced by a Deed of Sale of Unregistered Land and an Extrajudicial Settlement and Confirmation of Sale. Petitioners, heirs of Romana, Francisco, and Francisca, filed a complaint in 1992 for Partition, Recovery of Ownership and Possession, and Declaration of Nullity of the sale and settlement, alleging they discovered the sale in 1990 and that their shares were included without their knowledge or consent. Procedural History: The trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds of prescription and laches, finding that the action was filed 27 years after the sale and 25 years after the title was transferred. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. The trial court noted that co-ownership was repudiated in 1965 when some heirs sold the land claiming to be the only heirs, and that petitioners had only 10 years from that date for an action for reconveyance, which they failed to do. It also cited that an action for reconveyance based on implied trust prescribes in ten years from the date an adverse title is asserted, and that laches may bar such action even without repudiation. The Petition: Petitioners assailed the appellate court's decision, arguing that registered property cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession, that prescription is unavailing against successors-in-interest, that the right to recover possession of registered property is imprescriptible, and that laches is not a valid defense against Torrens-titled property. They also contended that respondents were not in possession as owners but in trust, that their possession was not adverse in good faith, that Francisco Ingjug could not have been a party to the 1967 settlement as he died in 1963, and that Eufemio Ingjug was not a direct heir but a son-in-law.
Issue(s)
Whether the petitioners' right to institute a complaint for partition and reconveyance is effectively barred by prescription and laches. Whether the Deed of Sale of Unregistered Land and the Extrajudicial Settlement and Confirmation of Sale are void ab initio and whether the action for declaration of nullity of the said deeds prescribes. Whether the dismissal of the complaint was premature.
Ruling
The petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the RTC-Br. 27, Lapu-Lapu City for trial and judgment on the merits.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of prescription and laches barring the action: The Supreme Court held that the action filed by the petitioners was for partition, recovery of ownership and possession, and declaration of nullity of a deed of sale of unregistered land and extrajudicial settlement and confirmation of sale. The Court emphasized that the nullity of the deeds of sale and the extrajudicial settlement was the basic hypothesis upon which the civil action rested. Assuming the petitioners' allegations to be true, the vendors could not validly dispose of the entire litigated property to the exclusion of other heirs, especially Eufemio Ingjug, who was claimed to be a stranger to the property. The sale of the realty to respondents was therefore null and void insofar as it prejudiced petitioners' interests. Consequently, respondents could not have acquired ownership over the land to the extent of the petitioners' shares. The Court reiterated that registration does not vest title and does not validate a void purchase. Furthermore, the claim that Francisco Ingjug, who died in 1963, appeared as a party to the 1967 Extrajudicial Settlement and Confirmation of Sale would be fatal to its validity, rendering it simulated and null and void ab initio. In actions for reconveyance predicated on a conveyance that is null and void ab initio, a claim of prescription of action would be unavailing because the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe, pursuant to Article 1410 of the New Civil Code. Similarly, laches cannot be invoked to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right. The Court concluded that the dismissal of the case on the grounds of prescription and laches was premature, as factual matters in dispute required presentation and appreciation of evidence. On the nullity of the deeds and imprescriptibility of the action: The Court found that the core of the petitioners' complaint was the nullity of the Deed of Sale of Unregistered Land and the Extrajudicial Settlement and Confirmation of Sale. If the allegations were true, these deeds were void ab initio because they involved the disposition of property by individuals who were not the exclusive owners, and one signatory (Eufemio Ingjug) was not a direct heir, while another (Francisco Ingjug) had allegedly died before the execution of the settlement. Article 1458 of the New Civil Code requires that vendors be owners of the property sold; Nemo dat quod non habet – no one can give more than what he has. The sale of the realty to respondents was thus null and void concerning the petitioners' shares. The Court explicitly stated that the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe (Article 1410, New Civil Code). Therefore, the claim of prescription of action would be unavailing. The Court also held that laches could not be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right, as laches is a doctrine in equity that should not prevail against a positive statutory mandate. The right to vindicate their inheritance was deemed imprescriptible despite the lapse of time. On the premature dismissal of the complaint: The Supreme Court determined that the trial court judge should not have summarily dismissed the petitioners' complaint based solely on prescription and laches without considering other issues, such as the validity of the contracts and their bearing on prescription. The Court of Appeals similarly skirted these issues. The dismissal was deemed premature because there were disputed factual matters that required a full-blown trial. These included proving co-ownership, the sale of hereditary rights without consent, forgery or deceit in the settlement (Francisco Ingjug's alleged death prior to execution), Eufemio Ingjug's status as a non-heir, non-payment of taxes, lack of possession or improvements by respondents, and whether respondents were innocent purchasers for value. Without evidence on these points, the Court could not affirm the dismissal.
Main Doctrine
An action for reconveyance based on a void contract, which is considered void ab initio, does not prescribe, and laches cannot be invoked against such an action, as the right to declare the inexistence of a contract is imprescriptible under Article 1410 of the New Civil Code.