Nagkakaisang Kapisanan Kapitbahayan sa Commonwealth Avenue v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner, Nagkakaisang Kapisanan Kapitbahayan sa Commonwealth Avenue, an association of families occupying the Calderon compound, claimed they purchased rights to the land. When the registered owners sold the property to respondent Toyota Quezon Avenue, Inc. (Toyota), Toyota assumed an obligation to relocate the occupants. A Memorandum of Agreement was subsequently executed by the petitioner, Toyota, respondent Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr., and respondent Social Housing Movement, Inc. This agreement stipulated that Toyota would provide financial assistance, subsidies for relocation sites, and livelihood support, with the transfer of occupants contingent upon the substantial completion of basic amenities at the relocation sites and the issuance of a Certificate of Acceptance by the petitioner. The transfer was to be completed by April 18, 1997. Procedural History: In June 1997, after the stipulated transfer date had passed, the petitioner alleged that respondents threatened demolition and forcible transfer despite incomplete amenities and the absence of a Certificate of Acceptance. This led to the filing of Civil Case No. Q-97-31342, an action for damages, specific performance, and injunction. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially denied the petitioner's prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, citing findings from an ocular inspection conducted by Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco, which indicated the relocation site was fully developed. The RTC, through Judge Eudarlio Valencia, subsequently denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The petitioner then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari and Injunction, which was also denied. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the appellate court's decision was likewise denied. The Petition: The petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse the Court of Appeals' decision. The petitioner argues that the appellate court erred in affirming the RTC's denial of injunctive relief, particularly by relying on Judge Velasco's ocular inspection findings, which the petitioner claims were superficial. The petitioner also contends that the appellate court wrongly dismissed the applicability of Republic Act No. 7279 (The Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992), specifically Section 28 concerning eviction and demolition. The petitioner further asserts that a subsequent demolition of houses in the Calderon compound on October 29, 1998, allegedly conducted without a court order and in violation of RA 7279 and the Memorandum of Agreement, warrants a preliminary mandatory injunction to allow their return to the compound.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's denial of the petition for certiorari and injunction. Whether the relocation site at Gaya-gaya was adequately developed with basic amenities as required by the Memorandum of Agreement. Whether the demolition of houses in the Calderon compound warrants the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction to allow the members of the petitioner to return. Whether the reliance on Republic Act No. 7279 by the appellate court was misplaced.
Ruling
The petition is not meritorious. The Supreme Court denied the petition for review on certiorari, affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court found no reversible error in the assailed decision and resolution.
Ratio Decidendi
On the alleged error of the Court of Appeals in affirming the trial court's denial of injunctive relief: The Supreme Court reiterated the rule that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court shall raise only questions of law. Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially when affirming those of the trial court, are conclusive and not subject to review. In this case, both the trial court and the appellate court found that an ocular inspection was conducted by Judge Velasco, who determined that the Gaya-gaya relocation site was completely developed. The petitioner failed to present evidence to overturn this finding of fact. The Court noted that the petitioner's counsel failed to appear during the hearing for the injunctive relief and the ocular inspection, despite notice, thereby failing to adduce evidence to support its claim that basic amenities were not completed. On the adequacy of basic amenities at the relocation site: The Supreme Court upheld the findings of the courts a quo that the Gaya-gaya relocation site was completely developed. This finding was based on the ocular inspection conducted by Judge Velasco and the fact that several residents had voluntarily transferred to the site. The petitioner's assertion that the judge did not fully inspect the site was a factual claim that could not be reviewed by the Supreme Court in a petition for review on certiorari. The burden of proof was on the petitioner to show that the amenities were not completed, and this burden was not discharged. On the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction: The Court found no factual and legal basis to issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to compel respondents to allow the petitioner's members to return to the Calderon compound. This was based on the established development of the Gaya-gaya relocation site and the MOA. The Court also noted that respondent Toyota had already established its facilities and structures on the Calderon lot. Therefore, the petitioner's reliance on Republic Act No. 7279 for this prayer was deemed misplaced. On the misplaced reliance on Republic Act No. 7279: The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the petitioner's reliance on Republic Act No. 7279, specifically Section 28 concerning eviction and demolition, was misplaced in the context of the prayer for a preliminary mandatory injunction. The Court found that the demolition and eviction were conducted in accordance with the orders of the trial court, which had determined that the relocation site was fully developed. The MOA also stipulated a transfer date, provided amenities were substantially completed, which the courts found to be the case. The case was without prejudice to the petitioner pursuing its main action for damages.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' denial of a petition for certiorari and injunction, upholding the trial court's findings that a relocation site was adequately developed and that the petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant injunctive relief against demolition and eviction, particularly when the petitioner's reliance on Republic Act No. 7279 was deemed misplaced.