Republic v. Desierto
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: This case concerns allegations of violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) stemming from a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) executed on November 20, 1974, between Agricultural Investors, Inc. (AII), represented by Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., and the National Investment Development Corporation (NIDC), represented by Augusto Orosa. The complaint alleged that Cojuangco, Jr., leveraging his relationship with then-President Ferdinand Marcos, secured favorable decrees and entered into a disadvantageous contract with NIDC. It further alleged that Cojuangco, Jr., in conspiracy with members of the UCPB Board of Directors, manipulated the Coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF) to siphon P840,789,855.53 to AII, thereby causing grave damage to public interest and the coconut farmers. Procedural History: The complaint was initially filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) before the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) on February 12, 1990. The case was subsequently referred to the Office of the Ombudsman, docketed as OMB-0-90-2808, following a Supreme Court decision clarifying the Ombudsman's jurisdiction over such investigations. Graft Investigation Officer I Emora C. Pagunuran, in a Review and Recommendation dated August 6, 1998, recommended the dismissal of the complaint, finding that the offense had prescribed. This recommendation was approved by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Ombudsman in an Order dated September 25, 1998. The Petition: The petitioner, the Republic of the Philippines, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to annul the Ombudsman's dismissal of the complaint and the denial of the motion for reconsideration. The petition raises two main issues: (1) whether the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in declaring that the offense had prescribed, and (2) whether the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in finding no basis to indict the private respondents for violation of the Anti-Graft Law based on the questioned MOA. The petitioner argues that the offense is either imprescriptible as an ill-gotten wealth case or that the prescriptive period should be reckoned from the discovery of the offense after the EDSA Revolution, not from the date of the MOA's execution. The petition also contends that the MOA was not validly ratified by subsequent Presidential Decrees.
Issue(s)
Whether the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring that the offense charged for violation of R.A. No. 3019 had already prescribed when the complaint was filed. Whether the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring that there is no basis to indict private respondents for violation of the Anti-Graft Law based on the contract in question.
Ruling
The petition is GRANTED. The assailed Review and Recommendation dated August 6, 1998, and the Order dated September 25, 1998, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the preliminary investigation of the case OMB-0-90-2808.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of prescription: The Court held that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription. The OSG argued that the offense falls under ill-gotten wealth cases, which are imprescriptible under the Constitution. While the Court clarified that Article XI, Section 15 of the Constitution applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and not to criminal cases, it acknowledged that prescription of criminal cases is governed by special laws. The Court further considered the OSG's argument that the prescription period should be reckoned from the discovery of the offense, particularly after the EDSA Revolution in February 1986, due to the alleged connivance of the respondents during the Marcos regime. Citing Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto and Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, the Court stated that in cases where the commission of the crime is not immediately known, prescription begins to run from its discovery and the institution of judicial proceedings. The Court found striking parallelisms between the present case and the Behest Loans Case, where it ruled that the prescriptive period should be computed from the discovery of the commission of the offenses, not from the day of commission, because it was well-nigh impossible for the State to have known the violations at the time the transactions were made due to the alleged conspiracy. The Court emphasized that the Ombudsman should not have dismissed the complaint on the basis of prescription without giving the Solicitor General the opportunity to present evidence. On the issue of the contract's validity and basis for indictment: The Court did not definitively rule on the merits of the alleged violations of R.A. No. 3019 concerning the MOA itself. However, it stated that the Ombudsman should have given the Solicitor General the opportunity to present evidence to determine if probable cause exists to charge the private respondents. The Court noted that R.A. No. 3019, as applied to the case, covers not only the alleged one-sidedness of the MOA but also whether the contracts or transactions entered pursuant thereto were manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, caused undue injury, and if the private respondents were interested for personal gain or had material interest. The Court also addressed the Ombudsman's view that P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 served to insulate respondents from prosecution, stating that a "legislative imprimatur" is not necessarily inconsistent with a violation of R.A. No. 3019. The Court found that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint without a full preliminary investigation.
Main Doctrine
The Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing a complaint for violation of R.A. No. 3019 on the ground of prescription without affording the complainant the opportunity to present evidence, especially when the case involves alleged ill-gotten wealth and the prescription period is subject to the 'discovery rule' applicable to cases where the commission of the crime was not immediately known.