Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Fact Finding Committee) was created to inventory alleged behest loans and recommend actions. Its functions were expanded to include non-performing loans. The Committee investigated the loan account of Bukidnon Sugar Milling Co., Inc. (BUSCO), which had been transferred by PNB to the Asset Privatization Trust (APT). The Committee concluded that the loan transaction between PNB and BUSCO bore characteristics of a behest loan, citing insufficient collateral and undue haste in its approval. BUSCO's paid-up capital was P1,500,000.00 when its loan application was approved, while the loan amount was $60,043,855.00 (P424,840,296.00). The loan was applied for on October 15, 1974, and approved by the PNB Board of Directors on November 20, 1974. Procedural History: Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, representing the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed a sworn complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against BUSCO directors and officials, and concerned PNB Board of Directors members, for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Respondents raised defenses including estoppel, prescription, sufficient collateral, and adherence to standard loan procedures. The heirs of Jose L. Africa moved for dismissal due to his death. The PCGG argued that the prescriptive period should be computed from the discovery of the offense (April 18, 1994) and that actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth are imprescriptible. Respondents countered that fraud did not attend the loan acquisition and that imprescriptibility does not apply to criminal cases under the Anti-Graft Law. The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause due to insufficient evidence. The PCGG's motion for reconsideration was denied. The Petition: The PCGG filed a special civil action for certiorari, assailing the Ombudsman's Resolution and Order, primarily contending that the criminal complaint was not barred by prescription and that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion.
Issue(s)
Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint for violation of R.A. No. 3019 due to lack of probable cause. Whether the criminal complaint against the respondents is barred by prescription.
Ruling
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari. It held that the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint. The Court found that the petitioner failed to squarely address the Ombudsman's basis for dismissal, which was the insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause. Therefore, the Ombudsman's finding remained uncontroverted. The Court also reiterated its ruling that the prescriptive period for offenses involving behest loans should be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof.
Ratio Decidendi
On the Ombudsman's discretion and probable cause: The Court affirmed that the Ombudsman has wide latitude in determining whether a criminal case should be filed, and this discretion is virtually free from intervention. The Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the Ombudsman's exercise of its powers absent compelling reasons. In this case, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint based on a finding of insufficient evidence or lack of probable cause. The petitioner, PCGG, failed to squarely address this specific basis for dismissal in its petition for certiorari. Consequently, the Ombudsman's finding that there was no sufficient evidence against the respondents remained uncontroverted. The Court emphasized that the determination of probable cause is a prerogative of the Ombudsman, and judicial review is limited to cases of grave abuse of discretion, which was not sufficiently demonstrated here. The Court noted that the original loan was secured by collaterals, the collateral ratio and capitalization requirements were not shown to be contrary to banking practices at the time, and no concrete overt acts of private respondents were alleged to show undue influence in the granting of the loan. Therefore, the Ombudsman's dismissal was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion. On the issue of prescription: While the petition extensively argued various grounds related to prescription, the Court pointed out that the Ombudsman's dismissal was primarily based on the insufficiency of evidence, not prescription. The petitioner failed to challenge this specific ground for dismissal in its petition. However, the Court also reiterated its previous ruling in Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto that for offenses involving behest loans, the prescriptive period should be computed from the discovery of the commission of the offense, not from the date of commission, as it was often impossible for the State to discover such violations at the time of the transactions due to connivance. The Court found the Ombudsman's interpretation of "if the same be not known" as "not reasonably knowable" to be unacceptable as it defeated the clear intent of the law. Nevertheless, this point became secondary to the primary ground for dismissal, which was the lack of probable cause.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ombudsman's dismissal of a complaint for violation of the Anti-Graft Law due to insufficiency of evidence, holding that the Ombudsman has wide latitude in determining probable cause and that the Court will not interfere absent grave abuse of discretion. The Court also reiterated that the prescriptive period for offenses involving behest loans should be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof.