People v. Pacificador
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondent Arturo Pacificador, then Chairman of the Board of the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation, and Jose T. Marcelo, Jr., then President of Philippine Smelters Corporation, were charged with violation of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The Information alleged that from December 6, 1975, to January 6, 1976, they conspired to sell land owned by the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation to Philippine Smelters Corporation for P85,144.50, when its fair market value was P862,150.00, causing undue injury to the government. Procedural History: Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the crime had prescribed and that the Information did not charge an offense, citing a previous Supreme Court ruling. The Sandiganbayan initially denied the motion, stating that the filing of a complaint with the fiscal's office interrupts prescription and that the issue of the sale's validity was a matter of defense. Upon reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the Information, ruling that Act No. 3326, not Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, governed prescription for special laws, and that the offense prescribed on January 3, 1986. The Petition: The People of the Philippines petitioned for review, arguing that R.A. 3019 provides its own 15-year prescriptive period and that Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code should apply suppletorily. They contended that the crime was discovered only on May 13, 1987, when a complaint was filed with the PCGG, making the October 27, 1988, filing of the Information timely. They also argued that respondent concealed his acts, preventing discovery.
Issue(s)
Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in applying Act No. 3326 to determine the prescriptive period for the offense charged. Whether the prescriptive period for the violation of R.A. 3019 commenced from the commission of the offense or from its discovery, considering the registration of the Deed of Sale. Whether the registration of the Deed of Sale constituted constructive notice to the government, thereby starting the prescriptive period, and whether there was any concealment that would toll the prescriptive period. Whether the offense charged had prescribed at the time the Information was filed, considering the principles of interpreting prescription laws in favor of the accused.
Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit. The Sandiganbayan's dismissal of the Information on the ground of prescription is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the applicable law for prescription: The Court reiterated that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 governs the computation of prescription for offenses defined and penalized by special laws, including R.A. 3019. This was established in prior rulings such as People v. Sandiganbayan. The Court clarified that Act No. 3326, not Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, is the governing statute for offenses under special laws. The Sandiganbayan correctly identified this oversight in its initial resolution. The Court emphasized that the prescriptive period for violations of R.A. 3019 is ten (10) years, as the amendment by B.P. Blg. 195, which extended it to fifteen (15) years, cannot be given retroactive effect as it is not favorable to the accused. On the commencement of the prescriptive period and constructive notice: The Court held that for offenses under special laws, the prescriptive period commences to run from the day of the commission of the violation, or if not known at the time, from the discovery thereof. In this case, the offense was allegedly committed between December 6, 1975, and January 6, 1976. The Court found that the registration of the Deed of Sale on December 29, 1975, with the Registry of Deeds constituted constructive notice to the whole world, including the government. This registration effectively made the transaction known, and thus, the prescriptive period should have commenced from that date or shortly thereafter, not from a later discovery by the PCGG. On constructive notice, concealment, and prescription: The Court affirmed the jurisprudential rule that the registration of deeds in the public real estate registry serves as constructive notice to the entire world. Therefore, the registration of the Deed of Sale, and the subsequent issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title, meant that the government, as the offended party, was deemed to have knowledge of the transaction and its contents. This constructive notice triggered the commencement of the prescriptive period. The Court rejected the petitioner's contention that the respondent concealed his criminal acts, noting the public nature of the registration. On the interpretation of prescription laws and the prescription of the offense: Even if the period were reckoned from the filing of the quieting of title case on February 28, 1977, the crime had already prescribed by the time the Information was filed on October 27, 1988. The Court reiterated the principle that in the interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused is to be adopted. The Court distinguished this case from People v. Duque and Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, where the prescriptive period began upon discovery due to the inherently concealed or misrepresented nature of the offenses, which was not the situation here.
Main Doctrine
The prescriptive period for offenses punishable under special laws, such as R.A. 3019, is governed by Act No. 3326, and the period commences from the discovery of the offense, with registration of the relevant deed constituting constructive notice to the whole world.