Serrano v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Roberto R. Serrano, a seaman, was employed by respondent Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. (local agent for A.P. Moller) from 1974 to 1991. During this period, Serrano instructed Maersk to deduct portions of his salary totaling HK$4,600.00 and £1,050.00 Sterling Pounds for money orders intended for his family in the Philippines. It is alleged that Serrano's family never received these money orders. Additionally, deductions were made for Danish Social Security System, welfare contributions, ship club, and SSS Medicare. Procedural History: Upon discovering the non-receipt of the money orders in 1978, Serrano repeatedly followed up his claims with Maersk, who consistently deferred resolution. In October 1993, Serrano made a formal written demand for payment. Respondent A.P. Moller replied in November 1993, stating that records from 1977-1978 were unavailable and denying outstanding money orders. In April 1994, Serrano filed a complaint with the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) for the untransmitted money orders and illegal salary deductions. The case was transferred to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Serrano regarding the money orders but dismissed other claims. The NLRC reversed this decision, dismissing the case on the ground of prescription, citing Article 291 of the Labor Code. Serrano's motion for reconsideration was denied. He then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed for being filed out of time. Serrano's subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied. The Petition: Petitioner Serrano seeks review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals' resolutions dismissing his petition for certiorari due to untimeliness. The sole assignment of error posits that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on technicalities rather than on the merits. The core issue is whether Serrano's claim for the untransmitted money orders had prescribed. Serrano argues his cause of action accrued in November 1993 when his claim was definitively denied, placing his April 1994 complaint within the three-year prescriptive period. The respondents contend the cause of action accrued in 1977-1978 when the money orders were allegedly sent.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that it was filed out of time. Whether Serrano's claim for untransmitted money orders has prescribed under Article 291 of the Labor Code.
Ruling
The petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated June 18, 1999 and July 15, 1999 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Labor Arbiter ordering respondent Maersk and/or A.P. Moller to pay petitioner his untransmitted money order payments in the amount of HK$4,600.00 and £1,050.00 Sterling Pounds or their peso equivalent at the time of actual payment is reinstated.
Ratio Decidendi
On the timeliness of the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals: The Court found that the petitioner had timely filed his petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The petitioner received the NLRC decision on February 26, 1999, filed a motion for reconsideration on March 4, 1999, and received the denial of his motion on April 6, 1999. Under the applicable rules then in effect, the 60-day period to file the petition was interrupted by the motion for reconsideration and resumed from the notice of denial. Thus, he had 54 days remaining from April 6, 1999. Considering that June 7, 1999, the last day, fell on a Saturday, the filing on June 9, 1999, the next working day, was deemed timely pursuant to Rule 22, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. On the prescription of Serrano's claim for untransmitted money orders: The Court held that Serrano's claim had not prescribed. Applying Article 291 of the Labor Code, which provides a three-year prescriptive period for money claims, the pivotal question was the accrual of the cause of action. The Court agreed with the petitioner that his cause of action accrued in November 1993, when respondent A.P. Moller definitively denied his claim in writing. Prior to this denial, Serrano had repeatedly demanded payment, but these demands were met with assurances and delays, similar to the situation in Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Ople. The Court reiterated the elements of a cause of action, emphasizing that the third element, an act or omission violative of the plaintiff's right, occurred only upon the categorical denial of the claim. Since the complaint was filed in April 1994, five months after the denial in November 1993, it was filed within the three-year prescriptive period.
Main Doctrine
A cause of action for money claims arising from employer-employee relations accrues not from the date of the incident or deduction, but from the date the employer definitively denies the claim, for purposes of computing the three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor Code.