Gabionza v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns allegations that Dennis T. Gabionza, as President of Manila City Bus Corporation, willfully and unlawfully failed to remit Social Security System (SSS) contributions and penalties totaling P2,193,747.97. The offense was initially charged as occurring within the period from January 1991 to May 1993, in violation of Section 22, paragraphs (a) and (d), in relation to Section 28, paragraph (e), of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended. Procedural History: An Information was filed on November 9, 1993. Petitioner Gabionza was arraigned on December 7, 1993. On February 10, 1998, the public prosecutor moved to amend the Information to change the period of the offense from January 1991 to May 1993 to January 1991 to May 1992. The Regional Trial Court granted this motion on March 31, 1998, ruling the amendment was one of form and would not prejudice the accused. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals, in a petition for certiorari, upheld the trial court's order and dismissed the petition, finding the amendment to be of form and not substance. The Petition: Petitioner seeks review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the amendment changing the material dates of the offense after arraignment violates his right to be informed of the cause and nature of the accusation. He contends the amendment is substantial and prejudices his defense. The Supreme Court, however, affirmed the decisions of the lower courts, holding that the amendment was one of form, not substance, as the new period was shorter and included within the original period, and that the nature of the offense and the penalty remained unaffected. The Court also found the argument of laches to be without merit, as amendments as to form can be made during trial, and the delay was reasonably explained and partly attributable to the petitioner's own actions.
Issue(s)
Whether an Information can be amended to change the material dates of the commission of the offense after the accused has been arraigned; and whether the amendment of the Information from "January 1991 to May 1993" to "January 1991 to May 1992" constitutes a substantial amendment that prejudices the rights of the accused. Whether the principle of laches applies to the prosecution's motion to amend the Information.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's order allowing the amendment of the Information charging petitioner with violation of RA No. 1161, as amended, is affirmed. The trial court is directed to proceed with the case with deliberate dispatch.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of amending the Information after arraignment and prejudice to the rights of the accused: Under Sec. 14, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, after the accused enters a plea, amendments to the Information may be allowed as to matters of form, provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. The test for prejudice is whether a defense available under the original Information would no longer be available after the amendment, or if evidence the accused might have would become inapplicable. Amendments that merely state with additional precision something already contained in the original information, adding nothing essential for conviction, are considered amendments of form. Jurisprudence allows amendments as long as they do not deprive the accused of the right to invoke prescription, alter the nature of the offense, change the basic theory of the prosecution, expose the accused to a higher penalty, or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment. The Court found that the amendment in this case, changing the period from "January 1991 to May 1993" to "January 1991 to May 1992," was an amendment of form. The allegation of time is generally a matter of form unless time is a material ingredient of the offense, which is not the case here. The amended period is shorter than and included within the original period, and the averment "in or about and during the period" provides sufficient approximation. Therefore, the original Information adequately informed the petitioner of the period of time when the crime was committed, and no surprise or violation of rights could spring from the amendment. The Court also noted that the imposable penalty would not increase as a result of the amendment, as the penalty for the violation of Sec. 28, par. (e), RA 1161 is constant regardless of the duration of the offense. The petitioner's argument that the amendment prejudiced his rights was found untenable. The Court could not see how his original defenses would be rendered inapplicable by the amendment or how the prosecution's theory would be altered. The petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to support his claim that the amendment would adversely affect his rights. The Court distinguished the present case from Wong v. Yatco, People v. Opemia, and People v. Reyes, where amendments were disallowed due to significant temporal discrepancies that clearly worked to the detriment of the accused's right to be informed. In this case, the amended period was shorter and included within the original period, and the prosecution's theory remained the same. The Court reiterated that the amendment did not alter the nature of the offense, did not deprive the accused of any defense, and did not cause surprise. On the issue of laches: The petitioner's contention that laches had set in due to the lapse of time between the filing of the Information and the amendment was found to be without merit. Laches is defined as the unreasonable and unexplained neglect to assert a right. The Court pointed out that Sec. 14, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure explicitly allows amendments as to form even after arraignment or during trial. Since the amendment was made "during trial," it was considered seasonably made, notwithstanding the four-year delay. Furthermore, the Court noted that the delay was partly attributable to the petitioner's own actions, such as filing a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals and numerous postponements and resettings requested by him. These actions suspended the trial and thus explained the delay in the amendment. Therefore, the prosecution could not be faulted for not filing the amendment earlier, as the delay was principally upon the petitioner's behest.
Main Doctrine
An amendment to an Information changing material dates of the commission of an offense after arraignment is considered an amendment as to form, not substance, provided it does not prejudice the rights of the accused, such as by rendering existing defenses unavailable or inapplicable evidence.